

Γ΄ ΠΑΡΑΡΤΗΜΑ

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ΠΡΟΕΔΡΟΣ: ΚΑΘΗΓΗΤΗΣ ΙΑΚΩΒΟΣ ΦΑΡΣΕΔΑΚΗΣ,
ΕΘΝΙΚΟΣ ΑΝΤΙΠΡΟΣΩΠΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΕΛΛΑΔΟΣ

24.3.2014 - ΖΑΠΠΕΙΟ ΜΕΓΑΡΟ

Athens, 30 June 2014

Dear Reader,

The Hellenic Presidency of the EUCPN focused, because of their particular importance in both the Greek and European context, on two topics: "Illegal immigration" and "Corruption". Academics and researchers presented the latest knowledge and research in these fields and representatives from public bodies and organizations summarized the actions that have been taken to tackle the aforementioned phenomena.

The first topic addressed the challenges that the flow of people from third world countries brings to Europe and mainly to its most vulnerable borders. In this context, well managed migration and integrating policies examined through the bodies that make a great effort to balance the prevention of the phenomenon while ensuring the protection of human rights, without undermining democracy.

On the other hand, corruption harms the society and economy as a whole. Though it varies in nature and extent, it affects the economy of European countries as well as their citizens. Legal instruments and institutions must be reinforced to prevent and fight corruption. Also, citizens' trust in democratic institutions should be enhanced. Best practices as well as good governance and the rule of law were discussed during a Knowledge Exchange session.

The Hellenic Presidency would like to thank all speakers who participated during the meetings and expanded the Network input on illegal immigration and corruption with their expertise.

Professor **Iacovos Farsedakis**
EUCPN Chair

ΠΑΡΑΝΟΜΗ ΜΕΤΑΝΑΣΤΕΥΣΗ - ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION


Illegal immigration, the perception of ghettos and the fear of crime in the center of Athens

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I. The dimensions of immigration


According to the last population census of 2011, the number of the foreigners was 911.929 or the 8.4% of the total population of Greece (10.815.197). This percentage was smaller in 2001 (7.3%) and much smaller in 1991 (1.6%), according to the ELSTAT published data.

Figure 1: Percentage of foreigners in the total population: Population census of 1991, 2001, 2011 (<http://www.statistics.gr/portal/page/portal/ESYE>)




The 21.8% of the registered foreigners originate from EU countries, the 58.1% from the rest of Europe, the 15.2% from Asia, the 2.8% from Africa, etc.

Figure 2: Nationality of foreigners, 2011 (Population Census of 2011, ELSTAT)




The majority of the EU originated foreigners issued from Bulgaria and Romania.

Figure 3: Foreigners from EU countries (Population Census of 2011, ELSTAT)




Almost the total of the foreigners originating from non-EU European countries, are Albanians.

Figure 4: Foreigners from non-EU European countries (Population Census of 2011, ELSTAT)




In fact, the first wave of immigration in Greece originates from the Balkans since the next vast immigration wave started after 2005 originates mainly from Africa and Asia. The majority of Asian immigrants issue from Pakistan and Georgia.

Figure 5: Foreigners from Asian countries (Population Census of 2011, ELSTAT)

However it is worth mentioning that the real population of foreigners living in Greece does not coincide with the number registered by the Hellenic statistic service (ELSTAT) and it is considered as higher.

Concerning the geographic distribution of the population, the fact that more than the 1/3 of the total population is settled in the district of Attica (3.827.624 or the 35.4%) is not a surprise. However, it is strange that almost half of the foreigners living in Greece are settled in the area of greater Athens (405.772 or 44.5%), where the most acute problems of unemployment are concentrated too. This situation is more contradictory when taking into consideration that most of these people originates from agricultural countries.


Figure 6: Foreigners distribution in the area of the District of Attica (Great area of Capital)

With reference to Athens particularly, the majority of immigrants are settled in the center of the city and in the areas nearby to Omonia square and its western, northern and northwestern neighbourhoods (Kolonos, Attiki Square, Kypseli, Patissia, etc). The massive character of this phenomenon led to the change of the profile of numerous neighbourhoods, which are abandoned by their traditional population and settled by immigrants. It is also worth mentioning that the first immigrants from the Balkans moved away from the most downgraded areas in which the new immigrants from Africa and Asia are concentrated. This image can be explained by the Chicago School ecological theory¹.


The aforementioned changes considerably influenced the social and urban profile of the city of Athens and especially of its center and the nearby western and northwestern areas.

II. The illegal immigration


According to police data (www.astynomia.gr), the immigrants arrested by police & port police authorities for illegal entry and residence during 2012 and 2013 were 76.878 and 43.002 respectively.

Figure 7: Immigrants arrested by police & port police authorities for illegal entry and residence -2012, 2013.

According to the same data, the traffickers arrested by the Greek authorities during 2012 and 2013, were respectively 726 and 843.

Figure 8: Traffickers arrested by police & port authorities-2012, 2013.


The nationality of arrested immigrants as is shown in the next picture is characterised by the dominance of Albanian people, followed by Syrians, Afghans, Pakistanis, etc.

Figure 9: Immigrants arrested by police & port police authorities for illegal entry and residence per nationality

1. Park R.E., Burgess E., McKenzie R., The city Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1925. Shaw C. & MacKay H., Juvenile delinquency in urban areas, University of Chicago Press, 1942. Ζαραφονίτου Χ., Εμπειρική Εγκληματολογία, Νομική Βιβλιοθήκη, 2η έκδ., Αθήνα 2004.


Concerning the nationality of the arrested traffickers, most of them are Greek, Albanian, Syrian, Bulgarian, Turkish, etc.

Figure 10: Traffickers arrested by police & port police authorities for illegal entry and residence per nationality



During the period of 2006 to 2013, the peak of the phenomenon is marked in the years 2008 and 2010, while a decrease is registered after 2011 according to the police and port police data.

Figure 11: Immigrants and traffickers arrested by police & port police authorities for illegal entry and residence for years 2006-2013



Source: <http://www.astynomia.gr/images/stories/2014/statistics14/xersaiatourkika2013.JPG>

III. Research evidence concerning the ghettos' perception in Athens


According to international research evidence, urban criminality constitutes one of the most complex social phenomena of contemporary society. In Greece, crime rates have traditionally been smaller in relation to other European countries. However, over the last twenty years, it has been established that there has been an increase in the number of committed crimes especially of violent crimes. During this period the number of foreigners among the offenders has also increased.

Table 1: Criminal offenders per nationality - Police data: 1991, 2011

Crimes	1991			2011		
	TOTAL	GREEK	FOREIGNERS	TOTAL	GREEK	FOREIGNERS
Homicide	229	204	25 (10,9%)	435	255	180 (41,4%)
Robberies	602	543	59 (9,8%)	2473	1136	1337 (54,1%)
Rapes	236	207	29 (12,3%)	211	113	98 (46,4%)
Thefts, Burglaries	7242	16707	9397	7310 (43,8%)
Blackmail	150	148	2 (1,3%)	362	251	111 (30,7%)
Frauds	422	408	14 (3,3%)	918	771	147 (16%)
Falsification	498	426	72 (14,5%)	4103	366	3737 (91,1%)
Gangs	1174	3709	2667	1042 (28,1%)
Begging	148	129	19 (12,8%)	1242	150	1092 (87,9%)

On the other hand, the level of fear of crime is high. The feeling of insecurity is even higher in the center of Athens² where the environmental degradation is accompanied by incivilities and street crime.

Figure 12: Fear of crime in European context



Source: Van Dijk, J.J.M., Manchin, R., Van Kesteren, J.N., Hideg, G. (2007). *The burden of crime in the EU. A comparative analysis of the European Survey of Crime and Safety (2005 EU ICS)*, Gallup Europe: Brussels.

Table 2: Fear of crime in Athens

Research	Rate of fear of crime
Zarafonitou, 1998	58,7%
Zarafonitou, 2004	52,7%
EU ICS 2005	55%
Zarafonitou, Courakis, 2006	56,5%
Zarafonitou, 2010	58,9%

The connection between fear of crime and the perception of quality of life arose more vividly in our research which was carried out in 2011 in areas which are fixed around five squares belonging to the central axis of the city. The basic theoretical assumption was whether the residents/workers of these areas consider their area a ghetto and what their attitudes are towards crime, fear of crime and immigrants. These findings are compared with those of the follow-up study which was carried out during April-July 2013 with focus on the impact of the intense policing measures applied since 2012 with the name

2. Zarafonitou Ch., "Fear of crime in contemporary Greece: Research evidence", in Ch.Zarafonitou (Guest Editor), Special Issue: Fear of crime. A comparative approach in the European context". *Criminology*, October 2011, pp.50-63.

"Hospitable Zeus" (Xenios Dias) aiming at the control of illegal immigration in the center of Athens³.

The term 'ghetto' denotes "an urban area where a minority lives in isolation"⁴. Although the first formations of this kind occur during the 13th century, their mass expansion was recorded during the Second World War, when the Nazis gathered Jews in isolated urban areas, the so-called 'destruction ghettos'⁵. In the U.S.A., the formation of ghettos is directly related to migration waves, which occurred at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. The most familiar ghettos are those of African Americans who moved from the south to the north and who were obligated to live in so-called 'colored neighborhoods'⁶.

According to international bibliography, in order to determine the existence of ghettos the following elements must be present⁷:

- *High concentration of a minority in an urban area* which displays overpopulation. The minority group (racial, ethnic or religious) is expected to dominate in percentage in the area in question.
- *Segregation*. The minority population lives in isolated conditions, is socially weakened and politically marginalized.
- *Social disorganization*. It indicates intense accumulation of social problems: poverty, unemployment, criminality, drugs.
- *The minority group is treated by the rest of society as inferior, foreign, different*. This fact appears as much as a prerequisite as it does a consequence of ghettoisation.
- *The factor of the states role*. Perhaps it will be active, even institutionalized, through legal ordinances. However, it is usually limited to a more indirect, tolerant stance.

These elements have been examined in relation to our surveys concerning the perception of the existence of ghettos in the center of Athens. In this direction, *three methodological tools* were used in combination:

First, on the spot observation of the areas undergoing research and of the streets in their vicinities was carried out.

In the second stage, 100 questionnaires were completed through personal interviews with Greek shopkeepers and residents (20 in each square). The follow-up study has included a small sample of immigrants (27).

3. Zarafonitou Ch. (Scientific responsible), Chrysochoou E., Tatsi Ch., (Collaboration), Perception of 'ghettos', insecurity and criminality in the center of Athens, non-published research, Panteion University, Athens 2011, 2013 (follow-up). See also: Zarafonitou Ch., Chrysochoou E. (coll.), "Environmental degradation, the image of ghettos and the fear of crime in the centre of Athens: research evidence", in Proceedings of the International Conference on "Changing Cities": Spatial, morphological, formal & socio-economic dimensions, ISBN: 978-960-6865-65-7, Skiathos island, Greece, June 18-21, 2013, 726-734.
4. Vasileiou Th.A., Stamatakis N., Dictionary of Human Sciences, Gutenberg, Athens 1992, p.79 (in Greek)
5. Browning C.R., Before the Final Solution: Nazi Ghettoization Policy in Poland (1940- 1941), 2005, p.15
6. Marcuse P., "Enclaves Yes, Ghettos No: Segregation and the State", στο David Farady (Ed) Desegregating the City: Ghettos, Enclaves and Inequality, State University of New York Press, Albany 2005, p.p.15-31(17).
7. Zarafonitou Ch., Chrysochoou E. (coll.), 2013, op.cit. See also: Zarafonitou Ch., (with the collaboration of: Georgallis A., Georgopoulos Ch., Mouschi D., Tatsi Ch., Chrysochoou E.), "Are there "ghettos" in the center of Athens? A criminological reconstruction of social representations of the inhabitants of these areas", in the Volume in Honour of Ch.Dedes, N.Courakis (Ed.), A.Sakkoulas, Athens-Komotini, 2013, p.p.149-178 & Prepublication in Criminology, vol. 2/2012 (in Greek)

In the third stage, a patterns analysis of their characteristics was done in order to determine the extent to which the ghettos' characteristics, as proposed by current scientific theory, appear in the research areas.

Summarising the main research findings it is worth to mention the following:

- The majority of Greek residents or workers in the areas of the survey (70% - 85% in 2011 vs. 50% - 80% in 2013) are of the notion that *they constitute the 'minority' in their area*.
- All without exceptions (100%) in 2011 estimate that there is a high concentration of immigrants in their neighborhoods. This rate remains very high in 2013 even if a little more moderate (75% - 100%).
- The majority of the Greek sample believes that there are *cultural particularities*, which influence the immigrants' attitudes and life style.
- *An area with a solid ethnic or racial minority was not observed, despite the fact that some outnumber others*. The dominant groups which settled in the above-mentioned areas originate mainly from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, Egypt, Russia and Africa (Moroccans, Algerians, Somalis, Nigerians). In relatively small numbers, the presence of people from the Balkans (Albanians, Bulgarians, Romanians) was mentioned, who seem to have moved to less degraded areas, with the exception of a large number of Roma from Bulgaria and Romania who were only mentioned in 2013.
- In the question regarding the immigrants' integration in Greek society, the dominant image is that they have not been integrated.
- Their views are more or less divided *when they were asked if they believe that immigrants desire their integration*.
- Although the majority of Greek sample has responded affirmatively concerning the integration of these populations. Moreover, the affirmative responses have increased in 2013.

Raising the subject of *criminality* in their area, they claim that:

- It is aggravated the last 5 years. However, these rates are lower in 2013 in comparison to 2011.
- The reported rates of personal victimization are high and they are increased in 2013. The majority of victimizations occurred on the street or stores the victims worked, and most of them reported more than two times.
- Despite the very high levels of victimization in 2013, the interviewees assessed more positive police's effectiveness than in 2011, when the rates of victimization were lower.
- Respectively, the rates of *fear of crime* indicated by the total sample of research are very high. However, in 2013, these rates are, in general, lower.

The dissatisfaction of the residents of the center of Athens from the degradation of quality of life is reflected in their intention to move away from their neighborhood. The comparison between research findings of 2011 and of 2013 shows that the number of Greek residents willing to resettle from their area was decreased in 2013.

In the follow up study of 2013, views of foreigners have been reported. More specifically 27 immigrants have been interviewed. We are going to refer the most important points which have been deducted:

- Although all the respondents have reported their victimisation, most of them feel secure in those areas.
- Most of them feel intergraded in Greek society.

- They coexist with other ethnic groups without major problems. Although, the criterion of ethnic group has arisen since the majority of them feel as a minority in the area because of the presence of other ethnic groups and especially of “blacks” as they have said.
- Problems with Greek people have not reported.

IV. Concluding thoughts

Even though the existence of ghettos is not confirmed as a whole in the basis of the aforementioned pattern, the majority of the respondents were convinced that their area *‘has become a ghetto’*. In fact, the conditions that characterise an area as ‘transitional’ towards

becoming a ghetto are determined in these areas of the centre of Athens. Consequently, immediate and regulatory state intervention is considered essential so that the centre of Athens will not undertake yet again its role as a ‘transition zone’, according to the ecological approach of the Chicago School. In fact, the amelioration of the perceived image of the areas from their inhabitants as it is registered in the follow-up study could be correlated with the increased police presence. Furthermore, this image of amelioration of the quality of life is accompanied by an ameliorated evaluation of police work during the period of the follow-up study (2013). However, this image does not coincide with the decrease of victimisation, the reported levels of which are higher in these areas than in 2011.



Mixed flows and Human Rights: The experience of the Greek Ombudsman

VASSILIS KARYDIS, Professor, University of Peloponnese, Deputy Greek Ombudsman for Human Rights

I. Introduction

The so-called "mixed flows" of immigration are referring to movements of people without legal documents, including aliens in need of international protection according to international humanitarian law as well as economic or other migrants. I would also like to submit that I prefer to use the term "irregular" instead of "illegal immigration", because I find it more neutral, with much less negative connotations and finally more precise. This is also the case in recent years for most of the international organizations and NGO which are active in the field, as recently the UN Commissioner Niels Muznieks pointed out.

The Greek Ombudsman is an Independent Authority with constitutional status, established in 1998. According to its founding law, the mission of the Authority is to mediate between persons and the state and public authorities in order to protect human rights, to combat maladministration and to safeguard legality. In 2003, the Greek Ombudsman acquired special mandate for the protection of Children Rights, while in 2005 the Authority was designated as the Specialized Equality Body for the implementation of the principle of equal treatment in the public sector. Recently, with the ratification of the Optional Protocol of New York (OP-CAT) by the Greek Parliament, the Ombudsman has been appointed as National Preventive Mechanism against torture and maltreatment at places of any kind of detention.

Since its establishment, the Greek Ombudsman has been and still is strongly involved with cases related with migration issues, including asylum procedures and third country nationals' rights.

II. The "genealogy" of immigrant influx in Greece

1. "New immigration"

After the collapse of the "existing socialism" regimes in the Balkans, Greece faced a massive and unexpected wave of irregular immigration, which turned it suddenly from a traditionally immigrant-sending country into a host country of "new immigration", as other countries of the European South, such as Italy and Spain. The phenomenon of "new immigration" is distinguished from the "old immigration" towards countries of Central and Northern Europe which was characterized by the "pull factor" of the need of labor force in the receiving countries and its more or less legally controlled inflows. New immigration on the contrary was caused by the "push factor" of economic collapse and impoverishment of people, wars and persecution, and its main features are the great extent of irregularity and the formation of illegal trafficking networks, the high absorption by the informal economy and the subsequent deficit of immigrants' social and legal rights.

In this context, new immigration faced almost from the outset distrust and hostility all over Europe and was connected with serious criminality and organized crime as well as subsequently with fundamentalist terrorism. Under these circumstances, Greek society developed strong defensive reflects towards the massive presence of irregular immigrants in the country, and soon a new Law for the Aliens (L. 1975/1991) was enacted, the provisions of which are solely dominated by the aims of deterrence and punitivity for the irregular immigrants.

2. The defusion of the phenomenon

This situation could not last for a long time. The adoption of a 'police philosophy' by the Greek administration in order to handle a serious social phenomenon and political problem as a "historic temporary accident" was obviously inadequate and destined to fail. The acceptance of this fact came by the ratification of two Presidential Decrees (358/97 and 359/1997 respectively), which allowed for the regularization of about 200.000 irregular immigrants out of a then estimated number of 600.000 people. That was of course a fragmentary measure in order to rationalize the policy and ease the social tensions caused by the presence of so many "institutionally invisible" people in the country. Finally, a new Law for Aliens was enacted (L. 2910/2001), which moved reluctantly away from the absolute 'institutional hostility' of the previous law towards more tolerance and preservation of basic rights for the immigrants. Consecutively, two new pieces of legislation (L. 3386/2005 and 3536/2007 respectively) moved further towards the rationalization and simplification of the legal framework, in regard to the issuance of stay and work permits and the provided safeguards against deportation and revocation of permits. At the same time, the mass media diminish the rhetoric about the involvement of immigrants with serious crime and, on many occasions, highlight positive sides of their presence in the country, like their contribution to the Greek economy as well as successful cases of second generation immigrants at school or sports and arts.

3. Second Manifestation: "Islamophobia"

However, towards the end of the same decade of the 2000', it seems that a new social eruption of strong distrust and hostility against the immigrants takes place, as, once more, the presence of certain immigrant ethnic groups is perceived as serious threat and the cause of major social problems. This time, the targeted groups are irregular immigrants and asylum seekers originating mainly from countries of Asia and Africa, who are increasingly entering Greece without legal documents since 2006 and onwards. Tough immigration policies in Spain and Italy and socio-political developments in Asia and Middle East, along with the implementation of Dublin II/III Regulation have turned Greece in a type of "storehouse" of European Union. A kind of "first aid station" for immigrants and asylum seekers in order not to enter the "Hospital" of Europe.

Once more, are observed big numbers of new-comers mostly irregular immigrants, without any previous networks, usually without shelter and work, with high visibility in public space, especially in the wider center of Athens where the presence of the older immigrants was already heavy. In the particular case, the moral panic which followed has also to do with the cultural parameter of the Muslim identity of the big majority of the immigrant and asylum seekers newcomers. The phenomenon could be named "Islamophobia", not mainly in the sense of the fear of the "radical fundamentalism" noticed in central and Northern Europe but because of real or alleged peculiarities in relation to habits and codes of values which differ and are faced with strong distrust and suspicion.

III. Immigration policies and human rights

1. The drift between legality and "illegality"

On the top of that, the severe economic recession of the recent years has had negative implications for low skilled laborers, affecting decisively immigrant population in Greece. Today, the non-European foreign nationals in the country consist of 1) immigrants with legal permits, 2) aliens who have asked for international protection and have acquired temporary legal residency, 3) aliens who stay without any papers. The latter are calculated to be about half of the over one million foreign born population residing in Greece, which means about 10 percent of the total population.

However, the reasons for the irregular status differ. For example, the number of those who are unable to renew their legal permit because they were unable to acquire the sufficient number of work stamps is rapidly increasing, which means that they lose, as well as their families, the previous legal status. Another category consists of asylum seekers, whose petition has been rejected but it is unattainable to leave the country. Also, the serious issue of second generation children when they become adults and lack the requirements for the granting of legal permit. It is imperative that this kind of "irregular" categories must find an institutional way out which would guarantee their basic human rights. In all these cases, the Greek Ombudsman has submitted specific proposals and suggestions to the administration in order to provide some kind of temporary legal residency along with the basic rights that the nature of such a stay allows.

2. Recent institutional initiatives

In January 2012 it was decided that the National Action Plan of Migration and Asylum and National Action Plan "Greece-Schengen" would be consolidated in a new Action Plan on Asylum and Migration Management. Among the goals of the consolidated action plan are the operation of the Initial Reception Services and the establishment of initial reception centers. Also, the recent Code of Immigration and Social Integration moves to positive for the protection of human rights direction, rationalizes to a certain extent the institutional framework and provides solutions for certain previously unregulated "grey areas". Though, the implementation is already facing problems. For example, the important one-stop-service must function more effectively and be promptly equipped in order to be really productive.

IV. Conclusion

To conclude, it seems that the institutional framework as it stands, provides certain necessary safeguards for the protection of refugees as well as other categories in need of protection through the possibility of granting humanitarian status. However, there is still serious deficit from a humanitarian law point of view in the administration of certain categories of people without papers ("sans papiers") who find themselves in an "institutional limbo" without any protection or guarantee for their basic human rights. Something, which has also led the European Court to repeatedly condemn Greece (indicatively, *S.D v. Greece*/11-6-2009, *R.U v. Greece*/7-6-2011, *Rahimi v. Greece*/ 5-4-2011).

Finally, and irrespectively of the necessary institutional initiatives in order to decrease the particular deficit, of major importance is the proper implementation of the existing institutional safeguards for the protection of human rights since, according to the long-standing experience of the Independent Authority, the discrepancy between "law in books" and "law in action" is still wide and in absolute need to converge, step by step and by the constant awareness of all those - institutions, organizations and persons- delegated and committed to that complicated, contradictory and thorny task.

Non-regular migration into Greece: Reporting and recording quantitative and qualitative research data

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1. Introduction

Migration and border control were within the **priority framework of the Hellenic presidency**. The Hellenic Presidency aimed to concentrate its efforts at highlighting the positive aspects of a comprehensive migration management and, at the same time, to attempt to tackle the problems arising from illegal migration in the economy, social cohesion and political stability. Instability in the European periphery together with the perseverance of the causes that lead to immigration flows into Europe, increase these flows and place an extra burden on EU member states, in a period of economic crisis. This burden falls mainly on the EU member-states that are at Europe's external borders, as well as on those heavily affected by recession and unemployment, Greece among them.

2. Definitions

Discussion on non-regular migration, as in any other scientific undertaking, should include the definitions or otherwise, the means and ways in which migrants become 'irregular'. This is the starting point into entering the process to count non-regular migration. As stated, the non-regular migrants can be discerned by their path into irregularity in the European South: namely, illegal entrants (including asylum seekers who entered illegally and are rejected after a short period of admitted stay as asylum seekers), visa overstayers (legal entrants on a short-term visa that expired) and migrants with a stay permit that fail to renew their legal status (due to the lack of a labour contract as most of them work in sectors with high levels of informality, instability and seasonality like tourism, agriculture, construction and domestic work). These pathways into irregularity are all, more or less, encountered in Greece, Spain, and Italy, three countries at the southern border of the EU with a high share of informal economy in comparison to north-western EU countries.¹


3. The language of numbers: How much non-regular migration is there?

In the attempt of building a concise data-base on non-regular migration we meet several kinds of problems ranging from the 'dark figure' question to issues associated to the specific nature of "moving sand" characteristics apparent in the actual numbers of traveling populations around the world. At best we are acquainted not with records of the actual numbers of non-regular migrants but with records of a variety of estimations of numbers based on specific tested indicators by compatible agencies. We are also acquainted

with numbers of official responses to this phenomenon and therefore of "close to" calculations.

The fact that Greece became the main entry gate to Europe since 2008 (with the interval of the Libyan crisis that affected Italy), shifted the official attention to the irregular entry in the country. As a knock-on effect media guesstimates on the irregular migrant stock of Greece went up to 1-2 million irregular migrants living in Greece. However, such estimates are disproportionately high in relation to the actual size of the irregular migrant population: the undetected population that is apprehended in the mainland is much smaller than assumed. The incidence of double counting is much bigger and the estimated outflow rate is much smaller than in reality.² One of the most valid appraisals of the phenomenon indicates that by June of 2012 the estimate of irregular migrant resident population in Greece amounted almost 400.000 people.

Estimates of non-regular migrant resident population in Greece in 2010 and 2011



Source: Maroukis Th., "Update report Greece/June 2012", <http://irregular-migration.net/>

At the same time, in 2012, almost 77.000 third country nationals were arrested for irregular entry and residence, of whom 30.500 at Greek-Turkish land borders and almost 11.000 at the Greek-Albanian front line. It is to be noted that in Greece according to the last census data in 2011, 912.000 foreigners (EU and third country citizens) reside permanently in the country.

Migrants arrested for illegal entry and residence by the Hellenic Police Force and the Hellenic Coastguard

2012	Greek-turkish land borders	Greek-albanian front line	Greek-FYROM front line	Greek-bulgarian front line	Crete	Rest of the country
	30.433	10.927	1.168	365	2.834	31.151

Source: Hellenic Police Force

1. Maroukis Th., 2012, "Update report Greece/June 2012", <http://irregular-migration.net/>

2. Maroukis Th., 2012, "Update report Greece/June 2012", <http://irregular-migration.net/>

Arrests of illegal migrants at the Greek-Turkish land borders, on a monthly basis for the years 2011-2012 show a spectacular decrease after August 2012 attributed to the intensification of border controls. Still, these statistics compared to respective statistics for the rest of the country's front lines indicate a changing trend in illegal entry routes.

Arrests of illegal migrants at the Greek-Turkish land borders, on a monthly basis for the years 2011-2012

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC
2011	2156	1650	2035	2891	3775	3689	5941	6339	7052	9626	6018	3802
2012	2864	2213	2569	3731	4501	4963	6914	2172	216	137	71	82

Source: Hellenic Police Force.

Another indicator the decrease in migrant remittances marks the effect of the economic crisis.

	Migrant remittances (million euros)											
	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	
Net flows	1.050,4	883,2	511,6	192,3	399,7	708,6	587,4	250,2	-151,8	-260,0	-269,8	
Inflows / Collections	1.248,0	1.048,7	721,2	697,7	906,5	1.439,5	1.478,1	1.157,9	928,8	662,4	329,1	
Outflows / Payments	197,6	165,5	209,6	505,4	506,8	730,9	890,7	907,7	1.080,6	922,4	598,9	

Source: Bank of Greece

The above indicator is better understood if considered in connection to the higher unemployment rate of immigrants compared to that of the natives, as shown below. On the other hand, the visas issued in 2012 amounted to more than one million.

Average unemployment rate of Greek citizens and third country nationals in Greece in 2012*		
	TCNs	Total national population
Unemployment Rate (%)	34,8%	22,7%

Source: EL.STAT.

Data refer to average for the period January-September 2012

Visas issued from 1.1.2012 to 18.12.2012

Total	Schengen Visas	National Visas
1.020.895	994.398 + 15.563 (VIS*) = 1.009.961	9.909 + 1.025 (VIS) = 10.934

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. * Issued by the Greek Consular Authorities applying VIS.

At the same time, a considerable number of returns has ever been increasing from 2012 onwards to arrive at the 30.000 people as recently announced by competent authorities.

RETURNS: STATISTICS 2012					
TIME	FORCED RETURNS ⁽¹⁾			VOLUNTARY RETURNS (IOM) ⁽²⁾	TOTAL
	FORCED (DEPORTATIONS)	VOLUNTARY RETURNS (HELLENIC POLICE)	RETURNS		
JANUARY	528	472	328	210	1.538
FEBRUARY	713	384	270	260	1.627
MARCH	949	417	443	334	2.143

APRIL	826	342	491	615	2.274
MAY	532	246	605	1.073	2.456
JUNE	468	254	434	784	1.940
JULY	411	619	527	-	1.557
AUGUST	714	377	193	-	1.284
SEPTEMBER	253	427	306	605	1.591
OCTOBER	693	323	407	727	2.150
NOVEMBER	500	203	457	1.045	2.205
DECEMBER	240	143	298	671	1.352
TOTAL 2012	6.827	4.207	4.759	6.324	22.117
	15.793				

Source: Ministry of Public Order and Citizen Protection³

On the other hand qualitative data suggest:

a) a type of Albanian circular migration into Greece⁴, an *irregular seasonal migration for work in agriculture, construction or tourism, which may have an effect on double counting in Albanians' apprehension data.*

b)⁵ Life-stories of Asian and African migrants being smuggled into and out of Greece suggests that on average 1 in 10 of the 2005-2011 non-regular migrant arrivals managed to cross to other EU member states. The number of apprehended irregular migrants attempting to cross to other states over the last five years indicates that the assumed outflow share is probably an underestimation of the reality. Also, from 2011 onwards smuggling networks seeking to open pathways to Europe have proliferated.⁶

Third country nationals arrested for illegal entry, deported and returned and smugglers arrested 2002-2012 and January 2013				
Year	Arrested by Police and Coastguard Forces for illegal entry and stay	Deported	Returned (through northern borders)	Smugglers arrested by Police or Coastguard Authorities
2002	58.230	11.778	37.220	612
2003	51.031	14.993	31.067	525
2004	44.987	15.720	25.831	679
2005	66.351	21.238	40.284	799
2006	95.239	17.650	42.041	994
2007	112.364	17.077	51.114	1.421
2008	146.337	20.555	48.252	2.211
2009	126.145	20.342	43.977	1.716

3. (1) With regard to third country nationals who have returned through coercive measures, the dominant nationalities are: 1. Pakistan, 2. Albania, 3. Bangladesh, 4. Afghanistan 5. Iran. (2) With regard to third country nationals who have returned through the assisted voluntary return implemented by IOM in collaboration with the Hellenic Police and funded by the European Return Fund, the dominant nationalities are: 1. Pakistan, 2. Afghanistan 3. Morocco, 4. Bangladesh 5. Iraq.

4. Maroukis & Gemi (2011) identifying a type of Albanian circular migration to Greece.

5. Triandafyllidou & Maroukis case study (2012).

6. Triandafyllidou & Maroukis (2012).


2010	132.524	17.340	35.127	1.150
2011	99.368	11.357	5.922	848
2012	76.878	17.358	4.759	726
2013 (January)	2.940	1.582	303	81

Information provided by FRAN, the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) in its most recent quarterly official report (2013 - third quarter), and by means of all FRAN indicators, shows that "there is a massive influx of irregular migration in the Central Mediterranean, more detections of illegal border crossing at the maritime borders of the EU and more applications for international protection in the EU than in any other period since data collection began in 2008".

FRAN indicator	2012			2013			2013 Q3	
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on prev. year	prev. qtr
1A Illegal entries between BCPs	23 095	22 093	13 613	9 717	24 805	42 618	93	72
1B Clandestine entries at BCPs	126	167	203	130	118	53	-68	-55
2 Facilitators	1 785	1 712	2 118	1 622	1 705	1 689	-1.3	-0.9
3 Illegal stay	84 891	86 759	84 817	77 127	80 125	85 608	-1.3	6.8
4 Refusals of entry	28 282	32 012	31 081	28 358	37 316	32 435	1.3	-13
5 Applications for asylum	59 576	73 769	86 109	72 850	85 362	97 207	32	14
7A Return decisions issued	67 891	71 129	61 025	55 285	53 586	57 583	-19	7.5
7B Effective returns	40 443	37 696	42 172	38 231	40 311	40 420	7.2	0.3

Source: FRAN data as of 5 November 2013


A summary of FRAN indicators shows a substantial increase in illegal entries.




It also shows a substantial decrease in illegal stay:



An increase in refusals of stay it is also evidenced:




An increase also in refusals of entry it is marked:



A substantial increase in asylum seekers bears witness to war problems of areas near Greece:




An increase in effective returns might provide evidence as to the Police and Borders controls effectiveness:



In Greece, according to FRAN information, the overall number of detections of illegal border-crossing remained more or less stable in 2013 but was still sufficiently high for Greece to be rank second among all Member States for this indicator. This is because Greece continues to be affected by two independent flows of irregular migration: at its borders with Turkey and Albania.

Detections of illegal border-crossing during Q3 2012 and Q3 2013




SOURCE: FRAN Reports: Detections of illegal border-crossing during Q3 2012 and Q3 2013 for the top ten reporting Member States shown by size of circle; gradient of the lines indicates the degree of change between 2012 Q3 and 2013 Q3 reporting periods

Until the launch of the Greek operation Aspida in August 2012, the Greek land border with Turkey had for many years been the main entry point to illegally cross the border into the EU. Since then detections have dropped to negligible levels but have risen elsewhere, particularly at the Eastern Aegean Sea and on the


Bulgarian land border with Turkey, now ranking fourth and fifth among all border sections. In these locations detections increased mostly of Syrians and, to a lesser extent, Afghans. At the Greek land border with Albania, detections of illegal border-crossing remained stable compared to the previous year, almost exclusively involving Albanian circular migrants. Detections of Albanians using fraudulent documents to gain entry to Greece decreased but the number of Albanian refused entry and detected as illegal stayers increased to the highest level in Greece for several years. Document fraud increased both in terms of detections at the external border and also of migrants making secondary movements within the Schengen area. Spain, Italy, France and Greece reported the most detections on entry at the external border together accounting for more than half of all detections at the EU level.

As already stated, in 2013 detections of illegal border-crossing in the Central Mediterranean rose to levels comparable with those last seen during the initial stages of the Arab Spring, while seasonal increases at other sea-border routes were much less apparent.


Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs by main irregular migration route.




Detections of illegal stay in 2013 per Member State (blue shades) and the percentage change from the same period a year before may be identified in the table below. In Greece a decrease of 46% is marked.



Refusals of entry at the same period in Greece, as shown in the table below, have increased by 14%.




In fact the immigration routes into the EU by land and sea encircle Greece.



In the blurred map below, one might easily detect that the major irregular arrivals in Greece which apart from the main land route from Turkey - nowadays less preferable due to control policies - continue to be maritime and ferry routes.




Followingly, one might consider the issue that the more control policies are enforced the more accidental deaths of non-regular immigrants are recorded. This means that more have to be done considering rescue operations.



However, the quantities of accidental deaths in trying non-regular entrance to the EU (marked in blue circles in the table below) show the magnitude of the so-called "Dying at the Gates of Europe".



In the following drawing it is apparent how Europe through non-regular migration borders control is being at the center of a "walled world", with the fence marks apparent.



4. Policies adopted (combating irregular migration)⁷

Turning to the policy issue, according to the latest national report on migration policy (EMN Greece March 2013), the policies adopted in this country on the issues of non-regular migration and asylum include the commitments as set out in the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum and the Stockholm Programme, which reflect the recently proclaimed EU policy priorities in the field. These priorities are set out in the following policy documents:

- i. Global Approach to Migration and Mobility⁸.
- ii. EU Action on Migratory Pressures-A Strategic Response⁹.
- iii. EU Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings (2012-2016)¹⁰.

European Agenda for the Integration of Third Country Nationals¹¹.

Accordingly, migration and asylum issues, have remained high on the political agenda in Greece. As mentioned at the latest national report on migration policy (EMN Greece March 2013), the policies adopted in Greece include the following:

In the field of managing legal migration, "One-Stop-Shop" agencies were set up within the Decentralised Administrations of the country, with the aim to simplify and accelerate procedures of obtaining or renewing residence permits. The procedure for inviting foreign workers has been simplified due to the limitation of bureaucracy involved and cost-reduction for the applying employer. Employers have been given the opportunity to attract, through friendly and fast procedures,

highly skilled third country nationals as workers. In the policy field of combating irregular migration, the so called "Xenios Zeus" operations for the arrest of irregular migrants in Athens and other urban areas and the prevention of third country nationals' illegal entries at the borders (starting from the Greek-Turkish land borders) were established as a permanent measure. The operations are considered as successful by the Greek government and the responsible Minister of Public Order and Citizen's Protection, based on the observed significant change in the urban landscape of the center of Athens and a spectacular decrease of the number of illegally entering third country nationals at the borders. The construction of the artificial obstacle (fence) in Evros has contributed to the latter. Temporary detention centers/camps were put to operation to host irregular immigrants upon deportation. Construction works of a First Reception Center at the borders (region of Evros) for the third-country nationals attempting to enter Greece without authorization began in 2012. Measures of healthcare and nursing of illegally residing third country nationals, as well as sanctions against employers of illegally staying third country nationals, were adopted. In the fight against human trafficking, a '1109-Human trafficking resource Line' (3rd April 2012) for the victims was launched and joint police force operations. In the visa policy, with the consent of the European Commission, a four-months pilot programme was implemented, encouraging few days tourist arrivals from Turkey with the issuance of the visas required at the entry points of the country. In total, during 2012, the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs fostered Visas' Centers in certain third countries with the cooperation of external providers, so as to respond fast -in 48 hours- to the increased demand resulting from respective entry applications. Greece implements VIS at the countries where the EU has set it in operation. As regards policy of external borders management the Greek government has revised the existing National Action Plan 'Greece-Schengen' aiming at enhancing further coordination of state agencies for the management of the borders, at improving allocation of personnel and assets and at the upgrading of facilities. A National Coordination Center for the Surveillance and Control of Borders has been established in order to strengthen external borders' control. In the effort to effectively surveil external borders, FRONTEX's active presence has been of crucial importance. FRONTEX joint operations POSEIDON 2012-Land, POSEIDON 2012-Sea, FOCAL POINTS 2012-Land and FOCAL POINTS-Air have also taken place. From 2012 onwards an increase of both voluntary and forced returns has been noted. There has also been some progress regarding bilateral readmission agreements, while the signing of the EU-Turkey readmission agreement in June 2012 was very important for Greece. Despite relevant efforts, developments in the asylum policy field have been slow. Migration remittances manifested a fall when compared with previous years.¹²

5. Organising legal migration and its effect on non-regular migrants

Since its launch in 2005 the Global Approach on Migration and Mobility focuses on four operational priorities: i) better organising legal migration and fostering well managed mobility ii) preventing and combating illegal migration and eradicating trafficking in human beings iii) maximising the development impact of migration and mobility iv) promoting international protection and enhancing the external dimension of asylum.¹³ It is evident from the priorities

7. European Migration Network EMN

8. http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/intro/docs/1_EN_ACT_part_1_v11.pdf

9. 8714/1/12 REV 1

10. <http://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/>

11. COM(2011)455 final

12. European Migration Network (EMN), Greece, Annual Policy Report, 2012, EMNEDIA.

13. <http://www.gr2014.eu/eu-presidency/the-greek-presidency/programme> and priorities.


schedule that irregular migration is intermingled with the policies confronting legal entrants. To this point research at EKKE¹⁴ has shown the following.

In a recent research project (2013)¹⁵ mapping all agencies governmental, non-governmental and civil society dealing with the migration issue in Greece we have concluded that there is a paramount and sound **compartmentalisation of knowledge and policies** as a large number of agencies, departments and bureaus are made responsible for designing and implementing the migration policy. These include the following numbers of agencies:

Ministries	12
Ministry Directorships	76
Regional Administrative Agencies	7
Regional Administrative Directorships	13
Local Authorities – Municipalities	325
Local Authorities Departments	1725
Civil Society Organisations	200


Only the 22% of all these agencies provide services exclusively to immigrants.

Exclusive services to immigrants




Most of the agencies provide legal services (documents, permits, etc), information and communication services, health and care services, while issues of residence mark the lowest attention.

Agency competence




Information and communication channels from agency to agency are evidenced to a large extent as most front-desk employees are providing information for services held by other than their own agency (77%). The competent public servants seem very well informed so that they are able to share information with immigrants (77%). However, they admit that there are information gaps to a percentage of 32%.

Quality of services



Claims are dealt with in most cases within a month, a parameter which has been improved during the past years. Most problems are arising out from the complicated migration policies and bureaucracy.

Operational problems




The 25% of agents admit that informal practices have been developed in order to help migrants in their stay in the country. Only the half of the agents responsible to address migration policy have been trained to this end. Only the half of the competent authorities believe that the services provided are compatible to immigrants' needs. Most of the competent authorities believe that the services provided are

14. See indicatively Tsiganou J. et al. (2011-13), Action 2.1./11, Research Project 2.1.a./11 funded by the European Integration Fund, Ministry of Interior, Balourdos D., Tsiganou J. Et al. (2011013), Action 2.1./11, Research Project 2.1.b./11 funded by the European Integration Fund, Ministry of Interior

15. See, final Report of the Action 2.1./11, Research Project 2.1.a./11, European Integration Fund, Ministry of Interior, Tsiganou J., Varoux Ch., Stratoudaki Ch., (2013), on "Mapping Structures and Services of the Public Sector for the Social Integration of Migrant Populations", Athens, EKKE. Tsiganou J., Maratou L., (2014): "Women's Migration into Greece: A Road-Map of Social Integration Policies", Athens, EKKE, Varoux Ch., Stratoudaki Ch., (2014): "The Social Integration of Migrant Women. Perceptions of public agencies", in Tsiganou J., Maratou L., (2014): "Women's Migration into Greece: A Road-Map of Social Integration Policies", Athens, EKKE, pg. 113-160.

incompatible to their agencies administrative potential and capacity. This is true to a greater extent for local authorities agencies personnel. The correspondence of the services provided to european standards is considered minimal.


Responsiveness




The way migration policy is implemented is confronted by certain problems, deficiencies and inconsistencies. The consequences of the lack of co-ordination among agencies at the level of policies maybe summarised in that the agencies launch different actions for same issues while at the same time important aspects of integration are discarded. The lack of strategic action plans and the lack of prioritisation of policies lead to overlapping and ineffectiveness of policies. The political agenda lacks realism in tackling the migration question. At the level of human capital resources certain elements of vital importance maybe identifies such as: Lack of a feedback information loop, lack of agencies networking, limited capacity of personnel. As a result:



Certain Gaps in services provided are identified




Lack of co-ordination between important stakeholders is evident



All these problems maybe alleviated by the adoption of best practices implemented with success in other member states of EU suitable amended to meet the Greek case. EKKE has made proposals for the expansion and better organisation of the "one stop shops", the better use of cultural brokers and inter-cultural mediators and the implementation of Back-End Offices for net-working and co-ordination of all communication and information channels. EKKE has proposed to amend the structure of the "one stop shops" to meet in a single unit the co-ordination services with back-end and front line approaches of all related competences.

Structure of one stop shops



6. Conclusions

In concluding the present discussion I would like to highlight the following: In an era when it is evidenced a widespread shift towards the abuse of legal channels and document fraud to mimic legal entry to the EU, which in turn results in facilitators being able to operate remotely and inconspicuously rather than accompanying migrants during high-risk activities such as illegal border crossing, the agencies dealing with the legal entrance, permits of stay and documentation rights should acquire more attention and operational funds, better programming and training and bigger share in funding their integra-

tion activities. As a high level border control officer has put it: *"It is our duty to protect the borders but this has become a high risk task. We are confronting dangers in every step due to the magnitude of irregular migration and the quality of the persons involved in trafficking. There is violence and threat out there towards "us" and the "others"... The situation has created grounds of mistrust for, from and against the foreigner. On the other hand our agencies are still operating with old practices and we have not newed our strategies, knowledge, resources and personnel"*.¹⁶

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The judicial fight against illegal immigration in Greece

PHILIPPOS MANOLAROS, President of the Board of Judges, Court of Appeal of Northern Aegean

Greece, after the fall of the regimes in Eastern Europe, was the receiver of the first wave of economic migration (with migrant workers mainly from Albania, Romania, Ukraine, Poland). Later, immigrants from Asian countries were added (mainly Afghans, Pakistanis, Palestinians, Iraqis and Iranians) as well as from African countries (mainly Somalis, Egyptians, Sudanese, Tunisians, Algerians, Nigerians and Ghanaians). Greece is characterized as the gate of Europe for illegal immigration.

A typical example is the Aegean islands Lesbos and Chios, where a massive influx of illegal immigrants takes place. These illegal immigrants are spotted by patrol vessels of the Hellenic Coast Guard, which continuously carry out patrols around the aforementioned islands and spot the captains and operators of inflatable vessels smuggling foreign illegal immigrants. The operators and captains of such vessels are mainly Turkish citizens, while the vessels smuggling foreign illegal immigrants are small inflatable vessels (with a capacity of 10 to 15 persons) in which 20 to 50 people are crammed. The vessels in question, even their lifebuoys, do not meet the basic safety standards and legal specifications.

When the captains and operators of such vessels get arrested, they claim that they themselves are also foreign illegal immigrants. However, most have Turkish citizenship and point to those who took them on board in order to smuggle them to the Greek coast. For smugglers to carry foreign illegal immigrants from the Turkish to the Greek coast, the promised fees range from 500 to 1000 euros.

The main reasons that the Turkish smugglers plead for these offences (those who have admitted them) are economic (health problems, debts, unemployment, blackmails etc) and political. There are also cases of smugglers claiming that, while looking for a job, they were carried to the Turkish coastland and were told that the job promised to them was smuggling illegal immigrants to the Greek coast for a fee; when they refused to do it, they were forced to board the vessel at gunpoint, being threatened that they would be killed or through the use of violence.

On their part, the Greek authorities focus their efforts chiefly on saving the foreign illegal immigrants' lives and then on protecting the sea borders of Greece. The arising problem is that when the vessels of the Greek Coast Guard prevent vessels carrying foreign illegal immigrants from entering the Greek territorial sea, the smugglers sink their own vessels in order to stop their return to Turkey, as well as in order for the issue to take on international dimensions and oblige the Greek authorities to allow them to enter their territorial sea.

The vessels of the Greek Coast Guard cooperate with the forces of Frontex, which – using a vessel of its own, as well as sophisticated equipment – spots the vessels carrying foreign illegal immigrants from the Turkish coastland to the Greek coasts, alerts the Greek Port Authorities and points the smugglers (captains and operators of the vessels in question) to these authorities, offering great help to the Greek authorities. The Frontex forces conduct patrols and only spot the vessels in which foreign illegal immigrants are carried, without however becoming involved in the operations for the arrest of the smugglers. The crews of the patrol vessels of the Greek Coast

Guard are under the coordination of the Joint Search and Rescue Coordination Centre for foreign illegal immigrants. After they have been rescued, foreign illegal immigrants and smugglers are committed to hospitals where they undergo medical examinations and, afterwards, they are transported and surrendered to the Port Authorities of the aforementioned islands, which conduct a summary investigation. Then, the smugglers are referred to prosecutor in order to be prosecuted for felony offences and, afterwards, they are referred to an investigator in order to defend themselves. The smugglers are prosecuted for carrying foreign nationals (who do not qualify for entry into the Greek territory) from abroad into Greece – an act from which a danger to a human, or danger to human life could arise – as well as for entering Greece illegally. On average, twenty (20) to thirty (30) smugglers of foreign illegal immigrants go on trial for the aforementioned offences every month at the five-member, the three-member and the one-member Court of Appeal of North Aegean. No prosecution occurs for exposure (Greek Penal Code, Article 306) if the smugglers deflated their inflatable vessels, with the result that the foreign illegal immigrants threw themselves into the sea at the risk of drowning; this is because the aforementioned offence is included in the prosecution against smugglers for carrying foreign nationals (who do not qualify for entry into the Greek territory) from abroad into Greece, an act which could endanger a human or a human life.

At this point, it has to be noted that, prior to the amendment of the Article 88 of the Law no 3386/2005 “On the Entry, Residence and Social Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the Hellenic Territory”, the sentences prescribed for such offences – if such an offence could endanger a human – was imprisonment from five (5) to twenty (20) years, as well as a fine of at least one hundred thousand (100,000) euros. After the amendment of the aforementioned article by the Law no 3722/2009, an imprisonment of at least fifteen (15) years and a fine of at least two hundred thousand (200,000) euros are prescribed per person smuggled; if death of foreign illegal immigrants who are smuggled occurs, then a life sentence is imposed. As a result, very long sentences are imposed by the Greek Criminal Courts, considering that, on average, smugglers carry a number ranging from fifteen (15) to fifty (50) foreign illegal immigrants with their vessel; yet, the maximum sentence that is to be served works out at twenty five (25) years. The Greek State has passed very strict laws to be imposed on those involved in the illegal entry and residence of third-country nationals from abroad; these laws have been passed as a form of crime prevention, in order to prevent other persons who want to commit such offences in the future, from doing so. The convicted smugglers serve sentences in Greek prisons ranging from eight (8) to twenty five (25) years, while fines are not enforced, because they cannot pay them due to their economic inability. After they have served their sentence, their lifelong deportation from Greece is ordered.

Moreover, the networks of smugglers in Turkey use juveniles for smuggling, so that they are treated by the Greek Courts better, due to their infancy. Most of the networks of smugglers in Turkey remain intact and do their heinous work. About 90% of the smugglers from Turkey who get arrested, do not have any money to appoint a lawyer

to defend them before the Greek Courts and authorities, as well as an interpreter. It is also worth noting that the Police and Port Authorities have arrested foreign nationals in Lesbos and Chios islands, who have been charged with, and convicted of, the offence of persistently receiving third-country nationals who did not qualify for entry into the country, from their entry point in order to carry them to the interior of the country, as well as of facilitating the illegal residence of third-country nationals in the country, acting for financial gain.

When the smugglers manage to get from the Turkish coastland to the coast of the aforementioned islands and to disembark the foreign illegal immigrants, some people of the same nationality turn up and receive them. These people, mainly Afghans, Pakistanis, Palestinians and Syrians, are asylum seekers in Greece and reside permanently in it – yet, not in the islands in question but in cities of mainland Greece.

All these take place for a fee, ranging from 1000 to 3000 euros per foreigner in order for him or her to be carried from Turkey; this fee ranges from 3000 to 5000 euros per person in the case of illegal immigrants from Syria, as smugglers exploit the needs of these immigrants, who have a good financial position and seek to save themselves and their families from the civil war in their country. Given that the coastal shipping vessels undergo checks by the Port Authorities, it is difficult for illegal immigrants to be smuggled in them, although efforts to do so are made by the smugglers.

In Chios and Lesbos islands, most foreign illegal immigrants trying to enter the Greek territory get arrested by the Police and Port Authorities, therefore their subsequent transportation to mainland Greece is not easy.

In the islands of Lesbos and Chios, the largest proportion of foreign illegal immigrants who are trying to enter the Greek Territory is apprehended by the police and port authorities and their subsequent transfer to mainland Greece is not easy.

It should be mentioned here that it has been recently approved an agreement for illegal immigrants between the EU and Turkey. Immigrants entering the EU illegally from Turkey or Turkey from the EU should return to their country of origin under the Agreement on readmission between the EU and Turkey, which was signed in December of 2013 and approved by the plenary of the European Union in February of 2014. The rule, which requires the return to the country of origin, will not only be applied to nationals of the EU and nationals of Turkey, but also to nationals of third countries who are either entering the EU via Turkey or Turkey by EU. The agreement contains obligations and procedures for the return to their country of illegal immigrants entering or staying illegally in either Turkey or the EU. It requires both sides to welcome back their nationals, third-country nationals lacking the necessary documents which permit their stay in the country and stateless persons who entered either in the EU via Turkey or vice versa. The Agreement will contribute significantly to the control of illegal immigration into the EU via Turkey, will help combat cross-border crime, especially trafficking in human beings and relieve the pressure, which Greece is facing and therefore the EU as a whole. Under the agreement on readmission, Turkey will receive financial and technical assistance from the EU for the development of border police as well as equipment for border surveillance. Turkey could thus keep more secure its borders with neighboring countries, such as Syria, Iran and Iraq. Before the entry into force of this Agreement, it should still be officially ratified by both the EU and Turkey. The provisions concerning nationals of EU and Turkey will enter into force two months after the completion of ratification, but provisions concerning third countries with which Turkey has not yet signed bilateral agreements will enter into force

three years later. What matters is the political will of Turkey to implement the above agreement.

Finally, regarding the measures to be taken by the Greek State, these are the following:

Should be made a modern and realistic immigration law incorporating all directives of the European Union, which seeks to be decided expeditiously by the Administrative Courts or Committees, which will be set-up, which illegal immigrants should be allowed to stay temporarily or granted (or not) asylum in Greece; these ones who are not allowed to get asylum should return to their country.

Illegal immigrants should be recorded by the Greek state, so that the Greek authorities know where they live and where they work and, if they fail to comply, their immediate expulsion will be ordered.

The ministries should issue handy leaflets translated in all the major languages of immigrants, of which the latter can easily and directly get informed about their rights and obligations in Greece.

Also, competent agencies should be organized and serve immediately and fully immigrants about the process of authorization for their stay in the country and the process of renewal of residence permits. These services should be extended even across the country.

The Greek courts must immediately condemn cases of traffickers and not remain in Greek prisons, as prisoners temporarily, for a long time. The Court of Appeal of the Aegean identifies off-line hearings for cases of traffickers of illegal immigrants from Turkey, because there was a large increase in such cases per year, due to the sharp increase in recent years in the number of those illegal immigrants who entered in Greece.

The safeguarding of the maritime borders of Greece should be intensified. This can be accomplished by increasing the vessels of the Coast and manning them with more experienced staff, since the islands should remain vigilant round the clock in order to prevent entry of illegal immigrants in our territorial waters.

The EU should ask Turkey for the immediate implementation of the agreements concluded with this on blocking the transport of illegal immigrants in its territory through Greece. The European Union should lift the prohibition from the agreement “Dublin 2” or suspend it for a period of time, so as Greece to send part of illegal immigrants in some EU countries, which they need manpower, taking into account that Greece is the main gate of the immigration wave to the rest of Europe.

The reception areas of illegal immigrants should be improved with regard to hygiene and living conditions, to protect women and their minor children, as well as children who are in Greece without their parents and not all reside in the same space. Also should the reception areas be grown in more parts of Greece, in order to maintain a reasonable number of immigrants, so that the latter can live in a better way.

The purpose of Greek society is the integration of immigrants in this, particularly those with legal requirements to remain on Greece and get integrated with the Greeks, in a peaceful cohabitation without discrimination between Greek citizens and immigrants. However, with the current economic crisis, if no action is taken, Greece will run out of Greeks and filled with foreigners. It is a country, which borders to the east is also the border of the EU and it should be protected from us and from our European partners, working together, following a migration policy that protects the human rights of migrants arriving illegally in EU countries but also the rights of its own citizens, so as to avoid extreme behavior from both sides.

International protection in Greece: The new Greek Asylum Service*

MARIA STAVROPOULOU, Director of the Greek Asylum Service

I. Introduction

Establishing a "fair and efficient" asylum system is an integral part of a modern and comprehensive management policy of migration flows. In Europe, as well as in other parts of the world (North America, South Africa, Middle East, etc.), many nationals from other countries arrive intending to stay for a short period of time, having fled their country either because their life, their physical integrity or safety are in danger there, or because they want to improve their financial situation and in general their living conditions. In the first case, the countries they come to have specific obligations to provide them with "international protection" - if they have signed the relevant international treaties-, while in the second case, the countries do not have the obligation to accept them. The obligations for providing international protection derive from international conventions, European Directives, and national rules¹ which in their turn reflect and integrate ancient values regarding the protection of the "foreigner" from danger.

Greece has been a country of origin of refugees and migrants for many decades. During the last twenty years Greece has been turned into a country of destination and entry into the EU, due to the political and economic stability as well as due to its geographic location, which makes it a natural crossroads between the countries of northern and central Europe and the countries of Asia and Africa. Therefore, it is very important to have a reliable asylum procedure as part of a comprehensive management system of migration flows, which will secure the refugee from the dangers in his/her country of origin, as well as our country from any abuse of this process from persons who are not entitled to receive protection. Granting asylum is not a philanthropic act but an obligation of our country pursuant to the international conventions and Greek law.

A fair but speedy asylum procedure, as the one being implemented nowadays in Greece and being presented above, ensures that purely economic migrants have no reason to resort to the asylum system, since they are aware that their claim will be denied swiftly, while genuine refugees receive the protection afforded by international conventions and national law within a reasonable time frame. International experience shows that the better and more complete the official information is which is provided to the third-country nationals relating to the legal framework for international "protection", the Dublin III Regulation, etc., and above all the faster the processing of international protection claims, the fewer non-refugees will apply for asylum. On the contrary, when the main source of information of third-country nationals is, for example, the illegal trafficking and exploitation networks, then there is a rise in international protection claims without valid reasons. In general,

a country attracts more irregular migrants when it does not have a comprehensive policy of migration flows management, when it gives the impression that its borders are not efficiently protected and when it seems to tolerate irregular migration. The international protection status that is given speedily but only to those who are entitled to it, emits a sense of fair judgment, order, and legality, which will be evident to migrants and to anyone who will try to take advantage of the vulnerable situation they are in, as well as to the citizens.

II. Clarification of concepts

The concept of "refugee" is determined by the Geneva Convention 1951 and it is differentiated from the economic migrant: A *refugee*² is someone who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country. "Persecution" is considered to be the violation of a person's fundamental rights, such as torture, arbitrary detention, discriminatory treatment endangering the survival of the persecuted person, etc. An *economic migrant* is someone who flees his/her country in search of better working and living conditions in the countries of his/her final destination. Economic migrants have the possibility to return to their country whenever they want, as opposed to refugees who cannot return until the situation in their country changes and is considered a safe place for them to get back to, as prescribed by the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, as well as other international and European instruments and national laws³. In other words, only if someone is not considered a refugee, he/she can be sent back to his/her country of origin. The distinction between those two categories is a complex process. Migration flows towards Greece are "mixed", since the refugees and the economic migrants use the same transit routes and entry points to get into the country. Both often lack legal documents (i.e. entry visa) or identity documents (i.e. identity card, passport, etc.), thus turning to networks of facilitators so as to avoid border controls, rendering the recognition and verification of their country of origin and their need for international protection extremely difficult. The first registration takes place, in case of arrest, in the initial reception and detention centers. As far as the asylum seekers are concerned, the case workers can understand, using specific methods and "tools", which is their country of origin, and determine through the asylum

* This paper is based on Ms. Stavropoulou's oral presentation at the Conference. It was compiled by Ms. Anastasia Chalkia, whose support is gratefully acknowledged.

1. For the basic legal texts see the websites of the Asylum Service (www.asylo.gov.gr) and of the Greek Ombudsman (<http://www.synigoros.gr/?i=foreigner.el>).

2. In Greece, asylum is often mentioned as "political asylum". In the present text the term "asylum" is used. Moreover, in the present text, the term "refugee" is used as a synonym to the term "beneficiary of international protection" which is more familiar to the public. For the same reason, the term "asylum seeker" is used here as a synonym to the term "claimant for international protection". In European law the term "beneficiary of international protection" includes recognized refugees (those who have been granted asylum) and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection.

3. For the basic legal texts see the websites of the Ministry of Public Order and Citizen Protection (<http://www.mopocp.gov.gr>), of the Greek Ombudsman (<http://www.synigoros.gr/?i=foreigner.el>) and UNHCR (<http://www.unhcr.org/>).

procedure, which ones are refugees. Communication with diplomatic representations to verify personal data is only allowed if the persons concerned are not asylum seekers or beneficiaries of international protection.

International protection is, according to the law, the refugee status (that is, granting asylum) and the subsidiary protection status. *Asylum* is the protection provided by the state to people who flee their country or fear to return to it because they will be persecuted. The requirements for granting asylum are based on, first of all, the Geneva Convention of 1951 relating to the Status of Refugees. An application for asylum can be made by someone who has fled his/her country and cannot return to it owing to a well-founded fear that he/she will be persecuted for reasons of: *race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion*. In order to grant asylum to a claimant, he/she must meet at least one of the aforementioned requirements.

Greek law adopts the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as well as the relevant Regulations and Directives of the European Union, which are legally binding for Greece.

The requirements for granting subsidiary protection are based on national and European law. The subsidiary protection status is granted to people who are in danger of serious harm in their country of origin.

Serious harm, according to the law, consists of the following: a) *death penalty or execution*, or b) *torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment*, or c) *serious and individual threat to a civilian's life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict*.

Asylum and subsidiary protection are two very similar statuses, which are also included in the single term "international protection status", which means that a person enjoys protection from the international community / another state because his/her own country cannot or is not willing to protect him/her (that is, to safeguard his/her fundamental human rights).

In Greece, everyone who is granted international protection status has the right to stay in the country for three (3) years. They have access to education, health services, the labour market, and social security. Responsible authorities issue travel documents to recognized refugees, while beneficiaries of subsidiary protection are provided with travel documents if they are unable to obtain a national passport, unless there are compelling reasons of national security or public order. International protection status can be revoked when a change in circumstances takes place in the country of origin that makes it safe for the refugee to return. In the case of refugees, there is no quota (that is a maximum number of refugees that a country is not obliged to surpass). In the cases where it has been decided that an international protection claimant does not meet the necessary requirements, his/her application is rejected and, if he/she is staying illegally in Greece, the process for his/her repatriation either begins then or continues.

III. The Greek Asylum Service

The Greek Asylum Service was established by law 3907/2011 and it is the first specialized instance in the country, competent to adjudicate on applications for international protection.

The goals of the Service, according to the law, are to apply the national legislation and to abide to the country's international obligations regarding the recognition of refugee status and, more generally, granting international protection to aliens who have fled their country due to well-founded fear of being persecuted for

reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, and who are unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country. The law more specifically provides that the Asylum Service shall receive, examine and decide on all applications for international protection lodged in Greece. The Asylum Service shall also contribute to the formulation of the Greek policy on international protection and shall cooperate with international organisations and the European Union institutions in the areas of its remit.

In addition, the Asylum Service shall provide the administrative support to the new Appeals Authority, also established by the same law, which will examine, at second instance, appeals against negative decisions on applications for international protection.

As part of its mission, the Service is responsible, in particular for:

- supporting the planning and formulation of the country's policy with regard to granting asylum or any other forms of international protection, as well as the monitoring and evaluation of this implementation,
- receiving and examining applications for international protection and ruling on them, at first level,
- informing the persons applying for international protection on the application consideration procedure, as well as on their rights and obligations under it,
- collecting and assessing information on the economic, social and political situation prevailing in the countries of origin of the foreign nationals and continuously monitoring the developments in these countries, in cooperation with the competent, for this purpose, other Greek or foreign authorities, especially in accordance with the relevant international agreements,
- providing third-country nationals applying for international protection, as well as the beneficiaries of international protection with the legalizing and travel documents provided by the applicable law,
- processing applications for family reunification of refugees,
- facilitating applicants with regard to material reception conditions, in collaboration with other competent bodies,
- preparing legislative texts and administrative acts on issues of its competence and
- cooperating with governmental bodies, independent authorities and non-governmental organizations, institutions and bodies of the European Union and international organizations for more effectively fulfilling its mission.

The Asylum Service is composed of the Central Service and the Regional Asylum Services. The Regional Asylum Services report to the Central Service. The Central Service plans, directs, monitors and controls the actions of the Regional Asylum Services and ensures that the necessary conditions for the exercise of their functions are in place. The opening of Regional Asylum Services established by this provision is decided by the Minister of Citizen Protection. On July 11, 2013 the Regional Asylum Office in the region of northern Evros started to register its first applicants for international protection in Fylakio. On 29 July 2013 a second Regional Asylum Office started operating in the region of southern Evros, while another Regional Asylum Office in the island of Lesbos started its operations on 15 October 2013. An Asylum Unit started working in the Pre-removal Detention Centre of Amygdaleza in Attica region and another one in Patra. In January 2014 the Regional Asylum Office of Rhodes as well as a unit in Thessaloniki started operating, while Regional Asylum Offices and Units in Samos, Chios, Heraklion and Patra will begin operations in 2015 depending on the availability of funds.

The Central Asylum Service is composed of the following Departments:

- a. Strategic Planning and Legislative Project Department.
- b. Coordination Department.
- c. Human Resources Department.
- d. Documentation, Training and Quality Department.
- e. Administration Department.
- f. Finance Department.

The Asylum Service is headed by a Director appointed by the Minister of Citizen Protection, following a public call or interest, for a three-year term. The Director is a prestigious personality, with a university degree and managerial competences. The Director is the Head of the Asylum Service and reports to the Minister of Citizen Protection, while he/she may be dismissed before the expiry of his term, or upon request or due to a failure to perform his/her duties or for another serious reason related to the exercise of his/her duties. The Director is supported by a secretariat, in the framework of which an independent Public Relations and Media unit operates, taking over and handling communication, public information and public relations issues.

Ioannis Papageorgiou was the first Director of the Asylum Service from 1.9.2011 till 31.01.2012. Since 04.02.2012 *Maria Stavropoulou*⁴ has been appointed as Director of the Asylum Service.

The Asylum Service is staffed with public civil servants, who are transferred, assigned or detached from public services, the broader public sector or public entities or by persons employed permanently or with an indefinite or fixed-term employment contract, in accordance with the applicable provisions. All staff must be fully trained for this purpose in relation to the legal framework, the interview techniques to determine the credibility of the claimant, as well as to evaluate the situation in the countries of origin. Significant emphasis is given to the quality training of the staff of the Asylum Service in relation to the legal framework applicable to granting international protection as well as to more technical matters (interview techniques, evidence assessment, collection and evaluation of country of origin information for the countries of the claimants handling, cases of vulnerable persons, unaccompanied minors, etc.) The European Asylum Office (EASO) provides the training through the EAC e-learning platform (European Asylum Curriculum), aiming, as far as possible, at the uniform training in asylum matters to staff of the EU member states. In parallel, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) assists in training of staff through organizing seminars and providing educational materials. Proper training of the staff is considered key element, as it proves to be a fundamental guarantee of a fair and efficient process of international protection.

Today in Greece the only way to grant international protection is to request from the asylum seeker to present to the Asylum Service his/her claims. Through a full interview the authorities can reach a conclusion on whether the fear that the claimant is evoking is real, taking into account the circumstances in his/her country of origin.

The new Asylum Service undertakes only the examination of new claims for international protection, submitted to the Service since it began its operation. Previous applications remain under the competence of the Greek Police.

Finally, the Asylum Service provides administrative support to the Appeals Authority, which was also established by Law no. 3907/2011. Asylum seekers, whose claims have been rejected in the first instance,

have the right, according to the law, to appeal against the decision rejecting their claim within a specific period of time. The Appeals Authority is composed of three-member independent appeals committees, consisting of an esteemed figure, specialized and experienced in refugee law or human rights law or international law, acting as Chair, a Greek citizen suggested by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and a university graduate with a degree in law, political or social sciences, specialized in international protection and human rights issues, as members, along with their alternates. The Appeals Committees are supported by rapporteurs and a Secretariat, headed by a Director. The Appeals Committees will also examine appeals against decisions that revoke the international protection status that was granted.

As far as budget is concerned, approximately half of the annual budget of the Asylum Service is covered by state funds, while for the rest the Asylum Service applies for funding to the European Commission, the European Economic Area and individual member states. In 2013, the Service received funding from the European Commission and UNHCR.

IV. The provisions of the Dublin III Regulation

Based on the EC Regulation 604/2013 (also called "Dublin III"), the first country of entry of a third-country national in the European Union usually has the obligation to examine and take a decision on his/her asylum claim. This means that those who have entered the European Union through Greece as country of their first entry, even if they file an asylum claim in a different European country, will be returned to Greece in order for their claim to be examined. If their claim has already been rejected in Greece, it is not re-examined.

Greece as well as other countries of southern Europe, including the European Commission, UNHCR, and various non-governmental organizations, have denounced the "Dublin III Regulation" as an unfair system which is impossible to apply in practice and costly. However, as far as other countries are concerned, which constitute the countries of "first preference" of the third-country nationals that also record higher numbers of asylum seekers than Greece, Dublin III is not under negotiation.

Assuring a fair and effective asylum system and abiding by our international obligations relating to the protection of refugees, strengthens the negotiating position of our country in the effort made to ask for changes in the European policy, such as the revision of the "Dublin III" Regulation, the practical solidarity expressed towards the countries under the more significant migration pressures and a system of redistribution of asylum seekers and recognized refugees inside the E.U. The possibility for cooperation on these issues is increasing with countries such as Cyprus, Bulgaria, Malta, and Italy.

During the last few years, due to a number of international court decisions against Greece on issues of the treatment of asylum seekers, almost all EU countries have suspended the return of asylum seekers according to the "Dublin III Regulation". These decisions concluded that Greece was not implementing a "fair and efficient asylum system", resulting in long-lasting uncertainty to asylum seekers, and because the living and detention conditions of asylum seekers were inadequate⁵.


5. The most important decisions are the following two: *M.S.S. vs Belgium and Greece* by the European Human Rights Court (Decision No. 30696/09, ECHR 2011 - (21.1.11)) and *NS vs United Kingdom* by the European Union Court (C-411/10).

4. See biography http://asylo.gov.gr/?page_id=228

V. Statistics for the new Greek Asylum Service


From January 2014 to September 2014, 6919 persons applied for international protection in the Greek Asylum Service. Of these 5636 were men, 1283 women and 335 unaccompanied minor

Figure 1: Asylum applicants from January 2014 to September 2014




The highest numbers of asylum applicants recorded were citizens of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Albania, Bangladesh, Syria, Georgia, Iran, Nigeria, Sudan, Egypt, Cameroon, Eritrea, Algeria, Iraq, and Senegal.

Figure 2: Asylum applicants by country of origin (January 2014 - September 2014)




According to the data from the same period, the recognition rate in Asylum Service (including both Refugee Status and Subsidiary protection), is 26%.

Figure 3: First Instance - Closed cases (January 2014 - September 2014)




The highest recognition rates applied to nationals from Syria, Eritrea, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Sudan. The lowest were for the citizens of Georgia, Albania, China, Pakistan, and Egypt.

Figure 4: First Instance - Decisions in substance recognition rate (January 2014 - September 2014)



At Second Instance decisions the recognition rate is 18% (including both Refugee Status and Subsidiary protection),

Figure 5: Second Instance - Decisions (January 2014 - September 2014)



As outlined, the Asylum Service is a new institution in Greece and has still many challenges to overcome. Over the next year its evolution will continue, so as to expand in other areas of Greece and be in a better position to respond to emergencies. Nevertheless, taking into account the circumstances under which it was created and started operating (namely, the financial crisis afflicting our country since 2008), initial assessments of its operation have been very positive⁶.

6. See for example the assessment by EASO at <http://easo.europa.eu/wp-content/uploads/Interim-assessment-on-the-implementation-of-the-EASO-Operating-Plan-for-Greece.pdf>

Management of mixed migration flows; a continuing operational challenge for the first reception service

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First Reception Service has been established with law No 3907/2011 and operates as a Directorate of the Ministry of Public Order and Citizen Protection. Its main purpose is the successful management of mixed migration flows, who enter the territory illegally in a context of respect of human dignity and in compliance with the European and international legislation.

At the moment, FRS consists of the Central Service based in Athens, one First Reception Center located in Evros (near the borders with Turkey), which operates since March 2013 and two Mobile Units stationed in refurbished Screening Centers of the Hellenic Police in the islands of Northern Aegean Sea, Lesbos and Samos, that are operational since 1st July 2013.

If we take into consideration that a few years ago all the above mentioned hadn't been conceived even by the most ambitious mind, then we could realize the length of the progress that has been made in the field of dealing with illegal migration and conditions of reception of third country nationals (TCNs) in Greece.

Furthermore, FRS is working feverishly to open its second First Reception Center on the island of Lesbos, which is expected to be operational in the next few months. Among others, FRS has a new mandate to operate Open Accommodation Centers for Asylum Seekers, Unaccompanied Minors and Vulnerable groups and several locations-buildings that will operate within 2014, have already been identified.

FRS plans to occupy a sufficient number of employees in the central service and the First Reception Centers (with a capacity to host more than 8.000 TCNs per year and a third FRC that will be under construction). Two fully operational and staffed Mobile Units to cover the needs of massive flows in the islands and several Open Accommodation Centers operating with a capacity enough to cover the accommodation needs of asylum seekers and vulnerable groups. Additionally, in cooperation with International Organization of Migration (IOM) FRS will have another Open Accommodation Center for TCNs participating in Assisted Voluntary Returns Programs.

In the long term, for the period 2014-2020 FRS has plans to increase further its First Reception Capacity, as well as make any necessary adjustments regarding the number of places in Open Accommodation Facilities with the aim to cover all needs.

Trying to give a brief description of the First Reception Centers and procedures, we would say that First Reception Centers constitute the competent authority for the screening and registration of all irregular migrants, who are apprehended by the authorities for illegal entry or stay in the territory. By no means do they constitute detention centers.

The irregular migrants, who are hosted within the premises of First Reception Centers, can only stay there up to 15 days. That doesn't mean that they cannot leave earlier, if all procedures have been completed, but statistically, the majority of TCNs stay for 12 days on

average. Only in exceptional circumstances for which due reasons should be given, can the duration of stay be extended for 10 more days (up to a total stay of 25 days).

The reception procedures are followed in a context of respect of human dignity and in compliance with the European and international commitments of the country.

- Upon arrival TCNs are directed to a room, where they receive appropriate and sufficient information (also printed material translated in ten languages-dialects) about the place they are, the reason they are there, the procedures due to take place in the following days, the facilities and services provided and most importantly their rights regarding international protection. There is also a representative of IOM, who provides information regarding Assisted Voluntary Returns program.

- They all go through a first medical examination and they are provided with psycho-social screening and support in order to identify vulnerable persons and to address any needs they might have.

- They receive non-food items (NFIs), clothes and shoes, if needed, clean linen and afterwards they are assigned to bungalows.

- The First Reception Centers are divided into sectors that include bungalows for the accommodation of TCNs, dining rooms, entertainment-recreation rooms, a prayer room and laundry facilities. Sleeping bungalows (equipped with air-conditioners and heaters) are spacious (5 sq. m. per person) and have 24h/day access to toilets/showers and warm water.

- Men, women, families, unaccompanied minors and vulnerable persons stay in separate sleeping rooms and wings and they are all provided with food, medical care and clothes, if necessary. Legal advice and interpretation services are offered throughout their stay and video conference equipment is also available, in case of lack or absence of on-the-spot presence of interpreters.

- The next days they are screened, registered and they are referred to a competent authority at the end of the process according to the case: asylum seekers are referred to the regional office of the Asylum Service operating in the First Reception Center, UAMs and other vulnerable groups are referred to open Accommodation facilities and all the rest cases to the Hellenic Police for further administrative procedures.

- In order to maintain a high level operation of the First Reception Service, a cooperation is established not only with international and European organizations such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and International Organization of Migration (IOM), but also with civil society organizations (NGOs), which have valuable experience working with TCNs.

As far as the Mobile Units are concerned, they are stationed in refurbished screening centers of the Hellenic Police in Lesbos and Samos and they are deployed for the screening and referral of illegal migrants to the appropriate authority.

Their role is vital, having in mind that Greece due to its geographical position with the numerous islands and the vast sea borders, has become the most possible entry point for migrants passing through Turkey or even the Middle East.

Regarding the Open Accommodation Facilities, the First Reception Service is in close cooperation with the Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Welfare for the operation of the open accommodation centers, which will function within and through the National Center of Social Solidarity. Several buildings have already been identified and the initial plans are proceeding without deviations.

Considering the fact that the National Capacity of places in open accommodation centers for asylum seekers and vulnerable groups has not been sufficient, the Ministry of Public Order and Citizen Protection aims to increase the overall places that would host asylum seekers and vulnerable persons like unaccompanied minors, pregnant women, victims of torture etc.

In addition, a project with IOM funded by the Return Fund (European Commission Emergency Action) is scheduled to operate aiming to provide accommodation facilities to TCNs, who will cover not only basic accommodation needs, but they will also receive emotional, psychological, educational support and the opportunity to live in a secure environment.

First Reception Service faces a lot of challenges, among of which are the country's problematic economic situation, the fact that racism and xenophobia have found ground to increase within social structures and the lack of experience in dealing with mixed migration flows on national level.

Copying with people is not easy, especially those who are in need of protection. Therefore, First Reception Service tries to make the most of the available tool-box that exists, like Asylum Support Teams, whose help is important in transferring best practices in reality and managing to keep a very high level system with SOPs, policies etc. that are in the front line of Europe. First Reception Service has a highly qualified staff that undergoes continuous training and also participates in ASTs to provide support to other countries deploying newly-hired asylum service staff.

It is of great importance for everyone to understand that migration concerns the whole EU and not just Greece. Europe should reinforce its external borders by using the key element of the Common European Policy on Asylum and that is solidarity towards the countries that are most exposed to immigration, like Greece, Italy and Spain. On the other hand, there is a series of issues that are open and need to be addressed, such as burden sharing, relocation etc.

The entire above make the management of mixed migration flows a matter of great significance for Europe and Greece and First Reception Service has committed itself to deal with the best possible way to achieve its goals towards that direction.

ΔΙΑΦΘΟΡΑ - CORRUPTION

Attitudes in Greece regarding corruption and towards ways of coping with it

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Due to serious financial and administration problems, there has been an atmosphere of immense crisis in Greece since 2009. This situation provoked the intervention, among others, of a European Commission Task Force, which agreed with the Greek authorities on a Road Map for technical assistance in the field of Anti-Corruption in October 2012. As a result, a National Anti-Corruption Action Plan named "Transparency" was prepared by the Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights in January 2013 and a National Anti-Corruption Coordinator together with a Coordination Committee and an Advisory Board were appointed in May and June 2013 (Law Nr. 4152/2013, Paragraph IG). Other *measures and actions taken in Greece after the beginning of the crisis in an effort to strengthen transparency and to combat corruption* include: the adoption of a law in 2010 placing all public institutions under the obligation of publishing their decisions online (internet); the appointment, in relation to political party financing, of a committee on expenditure control and election violations set up within Parliament, including MPs from all parties and three magistrates; asset disclosure of elected politicians, so that it can be publicly available; and setting-up a pharmaceutical supplies price watch, the introduction of electronic prescriptions and the centralisation of healthcare procurement.

However, according to two *Eurobarometer surveys* which were also conducted and published by the European Commission in 2014 as an attachment to its EU Anti-Corruption Report (February 2014), the perception exists in Greece that corruption is a widespread problem, that it hampers business competition and, also, that without bribery and the use of connections, entrepreneurs cannot obtain public service. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that *only 7% of the respondents in Greece stated in these surveys that in the past 12 months "they were asked or expected to pay a bribe"*. In addition, a huge majority of the respondents (87%) declared that they "did not report a corruption case"!

A similar picture is presented in research which was conducted in 2012 by the University of Gothenburg in Sweden on the level and relevance of the differences in the *Quality of Government (QoG)* across the 27 EU countries. (http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1436/1436225_qog-annual-report-2012_web.pdf). The so-called "quality of government" of this research is based on four specific categories, i.e. Government Effectiveness, Control of Corruption, Rule of Law and Voice and accountability. More specifically, the criterion related to control of corruption covered the following areas: (a) corruption in public schools, (b) corruption in public health, (c) bribery paid in return for health services, (d) bribery paid to obtain public services. In this research, Finland, Denmark and Sweden show high scores of corruption's control, whereas Greece, Romania and Bulgaria show relatively low scores.

Moreover, the *Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)*, published by Transparency International since 1995, is an acceptable measure of ranking 180 countries as to their perceived corruption. The CPI aggregates 13 different sources of data related to corruption and produced by the World Bank, World Justice Project, the African Development Bank, and others. A country is included in the index if it is reviewed by at least three sources. The lower the CPI rank, the lower the perceived corruption in a country. In the 2013 CPI Index Greece was ranked 80th out of over 180 countries.

On the other hand, *Transparency International Greece (TI-G)* has been producing an annual national perception survey since 2007 by means of telephone interviews (more than 12,000 every year) from all over Greece. Since 2011 there are data concerning persons who have been personally victimized by corruption, even if only once in the past (a percentage of 20,6% of the 2013 survey's respondents). It is believed that this is a rather representative sample. The vast majority of these victims are males, with an average age of around 50, who are employed and who have completed higher education.

On the basis of the responses given in this survey during 2013 (www.transparency.gr/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Παρουσίαση-Γ.Μαυρίνης.pdf), petty corruption in Greece seems to have reduced (-15% in comparison to the previous year 2012). This reduction, being continuous since 2009, is attributed by the reviewers of the survey firstly to the reduction in Greek incomes which occurred as a result of the economic crisis, and secondly, to the continuous campaigns against corruption carried out by the tax authorities and the NGO's. In addition, state controls in public and private sectors are considered by the reviewers as having become more intense and as having, thus, also contributed to the curbing of corruption in Greece.

According to this perception survey, incidents of corruption take place primarily in the public sector (76.7%). More people (in comparison to the previous year) have refused to pay bribes: 29.6% in the public sector and 33% in the private sector. In addition, *only 5.6% of the respondents could mention incidents of corruption in the public sector*, esp. in hospitals, taxation offices and city planning offices (a similar percentage of 7% was found, as mentioned above, by the Eurobarometer survey!). On the other hand, with regard to the private sector, the percentage of incidents of corruption is even smaller, i.e. only 1,9%, and mainly in private hospitals.

These remarks demonstrate, in my opinion, how fragile and problematic the results of a perception survey can be and, consequently, *how wide the gap can be between the broader idea which the respondents may have in connection to the extent of corruption in their country, and the factual incidents of corruption which they themselves have experienced*. Under this aspect, a reasonable question which arises within this framework, is just how valid these perception

studies are, which are based solely on the criterion of *perception*. In fact, this kind of assessment, widely seen as *subjective*, is merely a reflection of how a qualified sample of people *perceives* corruption in a specific country, *on the basis of several factors which may shape their opinion* (cf. Alex Cobham, *Corrupting Perceptions*, in: Foreign Policy, 22.7.2013: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/07/22/corrupting_perceptions).

One key factor, for example, is the frequency with which the mass media report instances of corruption in each country. Another factor, related to the previous, is how far investigative journalism is prepared to go and how it angles its criticism on the topic of corruption. Indeed, corruption, economic crimes and white collar crimes in general may be over-represented in the media, especially when they are to be used as a means of competition in the political arena. Indeed, the frequency with which the media report instances of corruption in each country may also depend on the political balance and the priorities/ strategies of the political parties.

To emphasize the point, sociologists have shown that these factors can deeply affect the way the public perceive crime levels, and their reactions of fear and insecurity can be manipulated accordingly. What is significant is the mismatch between the public's perception of crime levels and the real figures, which, as seen above, are often found to be considerably lower.

Furthermore, corruption perception studies, despite their purpose to focus the world's attention on the need to monitor corruption and to offer a map of corruption of the whole world, may not only be misleading in relation to the real dimensions of corruption in a country, but may also have a negative rebound effect on that country, as they can be used by foreign enterprises in an erroneous manner. As the economic literature about corruption has explained to no small extent, corruption can also influence the economic growth of a country where direct foreign investments are concerned. In these cases, the corruption perception studies such as the CPI run the risk of giving distorted criteria to foreign enterprises to use as part of their decision-making process as to whether to invest in a specific country or not.

It would be better therefore, in my opinion, to base such crucial judgment as to how far a country is corrupt, on a more complex index than that of perception, an index which would take into account a wider range of parameters measuring both corruption perception rates and the efforts of a country to adopt anti-corruption policies at a legislative and administrative level. *Parameters, for instance, such as the existing legal framework, the way in which this legislation is enforced (including cases of corruption revealed and/or brought before the courts), best administrative practices of a country to cope with its indigenous corruption, but also the effectiveness of all these measures in practice.* As a result, we believe that a *multifactorial corruption index* (MCI), based on up-to-date and comparable data, as well as on cross-referenced facts would be more representative and objective and, consequently, more accurate and ultimately fair to the countries in question (Courakis, N. /Mannozi, G., *Confronting Corruption in Greece and Italy*, in: *Honorary Volume in Memory of Professor Dr. Chr. Dedes*, Ant.N. Sakkoulas Publishers, 2013, 11-44: 11-12; cf. Nestor Courakis, *Confronting Corruption in Greece: An Overview*, paper presented at the Anti-Corruption Seminar 2011 in Lemessos, Cyprus on 11.3.2011, accessible on-line in: www.transparencycyprus.org/assets/).

There are also *other important surveys and research on corruption in Greece*, but I would like, at this point, to focus on two particular surveys concerning the attitudes of Greek university students towards corruption *in relation to the economic crisis of the recent years*. The first survey was conducted in 2011 by Professor Calliope Spinelli

(University of Athens) and the second one in 2014 by the author of this paper.

According to the results of the *Spinelli survey*, 67.7% of the students attribute the country's economic crisis to corruption and 62.8% to politicians in general. In addition, more than 50% of the respondents point out that there is "considerable" or "a lot" of corruption within the Police, the City Planning Offices, the Public Health Services and the Taxation Offices. Interestingly enough, the majority of the respondents (72.6%) declare that those who are involved in active petty bribery for health reasons for themselves or for their relatives should not be punished. On the contrary, *almost 90% of the students are of the opinion that both civil servants and businessmen engaged in bribery concerning public works should be punished*.

On the other hand, according to the results of the *Courakis survey*, 57.95% of the respondents stated that they would never give money as bribery in order for their case to be handled by a civil servant in a more "favorable" or speedy manner. Furthermore, the respondents considered both petty corruption and grand corruption as almost equally serious (percentages respectively: 49.2% and 48.7%).

They also explained in a realistic manner the *reasons why the acts of corruption in recent years are* being "somewhat" more disapproved by the public than before (37.95%). The main reason for this development is, according to the respondents, the economic crisis and austerity, which have diminished people's income (50.3% of the them said that shortfall of money explains "sufficiently" the possible opposition of the public to corruption –the same conclusion, as mentioned above, is adopted by the Transparency International-Greece in its recent survey as an explanation for the fact that petty corruption has been reduced since 2009). Other explanations which have contributed to this opposition, according to respondents and by rank of priorities, are: (a) that acts of corruption are not ethically correct, (b) that there has been a change in the way that political leaders and judges cope with the problem of corruption, and (c) that corrupt transactions are humiliating for persons who participate in them.

Concerning the *priorities to cope with corruption*, the respondents have stressed above all the importance of education of young people from kindergarten to university and, furthermore, the significance of meritocracy in selecting and promoting civil servants. Other priorities have been classified as follows: (1) strict implementation of corruption's laws to everyone who violates them, hence also to persons of higher socio-economic level, (2) certainty of the arrest and conviction of the laws' transgressors (an important priority, which was already stressed by Beccaria in his famous essay of 1764), (3) restriction of complicated bureaucratic procedures and of unclear legislative procedures which make citizens' assistance by civil servants difficult and therefore facilitate acts of corruption by them, (4) severe laws for every act of corruption (hence implementation of laws is more important than their mere promulgation!), (5) reinforcement of the (good) example given to the citizens by the political leaders and intellectuals through their own behavior, (6) information campaigns aimed at rendering the public more sensitive to matters of corruption, (7) in vulnerable state cases, preference should be given to electronic governance and the so-called Centers for Serving the Citizen (in Greece known as K.E.P.), i.e. state agencies which function as intermediaries between competent public services and citizens, rather than to direct contact between citizens and public servants.

In addition to these priorities, there is also a series of more specific suggestions, which were included in the *a.m. EU Anti-Corruption Report on Greece (2014)*. These suggestions focus mainly on deficits in the following sectors: legislation, anti-corruption coordination,

political activities, public administration, and public procurements. In particular, it is suggested: (a) to tackle clientelism and favouritism in public administration in a more vigorous way; (b) to ensure sufficient powers and support in order to enable the national anti-corruption coordinator to implement anti-corruption policies; (c) to strengthen the supervision of party funding and the independence, efficiency and transparency of the Control Committee; (d) to ensure a professional independent verification mechanism for asset declarations of high-level elected and appointed officials; (e) to take steps in order to eliminate politicians' immunities; (f) to reform the statute of limitations; and (g) to enhance the oversight of public procurement.

It is evident that although these suggestions, together with the survey's results on students' priorities concern primarily Greece, they can also, more or less, constitute a general catalogue of main

techniques to tackle corruption. In this sense, we can consider our present meeting as an occasion not only to learn about other countries' fight against corruption, but also to create, by means of these countries' experiences, a check-list of all necessary tools which constitute an effective modern anti-corruption strategy.

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(the above paper is based on a contribution entitled "Anti-corruption measures: The Panacea to a Financial Cliff" and was prepared as a common article together with Associate Professor Maria Krambia-Kapardis, Cyprus University of Technology, to be published in the coming months by Springer Verlag as part of a collective volume on financial crimes).



The relevance of perceptions of corruption to crime prevention in Greece*

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I. Introduction

The article refers to the general findings of a research project which examined the relevance of perceptions of corruption to crime prevention in Greece¹. It also includes the findings of official reports published by various control bodies against corruption in Greece during the last decades, and the results of the European Values Surveys of 1999/2000 and 2008 in order to associate the existing views with facts and hard data.

II. The research

The project has started on 1st January 2006 and ended on 31st July 2009 and it consisted of three phases. During the first phase in order to assess existing conceptualizations of corruption we studied official documents, during the second phase we discussed in private and interviewed anonymously various decision-makers: politicians, representatives of public administration, justice, media, police, economy and NGOs. During the third phase we analysed theoretically our findings. The content analysis of texts and interviews was carried out with the software Atlas-ti 5.0.

Specifically, the research team² generated during the **first project period** (2006) documents from all target groups under examination (see above). It examined among others, Parliamentary proceedings (2001-2005), reports of the Parliamentary Committee on Institutional Issues and Transparency (2000-2005), electoral programmes of political parties, articles from three daily newspapers of high circulation (2003-2005), legislation and court decisions (1987-2005), NGOs Reports (2000-2005), findings of investigations of General Public Prosecutors (2001, 2002), of party committees (2001) etc.

The project design required selecting at least two case studies, one of which should refer to party financing. Those chosen (two)

could generate more data for each target group and caused no serious problems to data collection.

- *Case A – Description.* The party financing case study refers to alleged 'hidden' accounts of the right wing party and its President at the beginning of the 1990s.

- *Case B – Description.* The second refers to claims of illegal naturalization of foreign nationals - mainly from the former Soviet republics - occurred after the 2000 general elections, under the pretext that they were repatriated Greek Pontians that qualified for such documents.

In the **second project period**, the research team interviewed representatives of the target groups (22 interviews with 25 persons) in order to assess existing conceptualizations of corruption in Greece and to compare these findings with the results of the previous period.

The content analysis of the documents in the first phase, as well as the interviews in the second, was focused on a) definitions of corruption, b) perceptions of the causes of corruption, c) significance and extension of the problem, d) identification of the victims of corruption, and of the 'corrupt' attributed actors/offenders, and finally e) the perceptions of general anti-corruption legislation (EU and Greek).

As noted previously, in the third phase, we studied national analyses in order to compare them with our findings during the two periods' and foreign analyses in order to integrate the two periods' findings into a theoretical context.

III. Findings

1. Perceptions of corruption according to public discourse (1st Phase)

In the official debate a moral and more or less emotional understanding of the issue prevailed, which is usually either case- or person oriented. The main 'carriers' of the discourse on corruption and its derivatives ('opacity', 'synchronizing of interests', 'maladministration', 'misgovernment etc.) are Politicians and the Media.

The first consider themselves the main group responsible for corruption control and promotion of transparency in society, while the second promote themselves as guardians of public ethics. Although politicians refer several times to 'merging of interests', 'corruption' etc., when a specific case emerges their debates turn to be mostly party-political. Corruption is referred to mainly as a *social illness* and occasionally as a *social phenomenon* of modern societies.

Public administration receives the strongest criticism, as being the basic impediment to transparency and therefore the development of the country; unlike the private economy which is presented as the main 'victim' of corruption. However, Unions' representatives of public administration do not participate in the debate, unless their view

* The article is dedicated to the memory of Dr. Garyfallia Massouri, a dear colleague and friend who left us in January 2014.

1. Panteion University participated in an EU research study, led by the University of Konstanz/Germany and Prof. Dr. Hans-Georg Soeffner, concerning the construction of corruption in certain European countries: *Specific Targeted Research Project: Crime and Culture. The relevance of perceptions of corruption to crime prevention. A comparative cultural study in the EU-accession states Bulgaria and Romania, the EU-candidate states Turkey and Croatia and the EU-states Germany, Greece and United Kingdom. Priority 7- FP6 EUROPEAN COMMISSION-2004 -Citizens-5* (at: <http://www.uni-konstanz.de/crimeandculture/crimeandculture.html>).

2. The research was carried out and the results are a common piece of work with my Greek colleagues who participated in the Project, of different composition, different length of time, and on various periods of the research: S. Ageli (MA), E. Bakali (MA, Ministry of Interior and Public Administration), N. Papamanolis (MA, Ministry of Interior and Public Administration), E. Bakirli (MA), Dr. Iosifides (Assistant Prof., Univ. of Aegean), Dr. Garyfallia Massouri and P. Salihos (MA).

is not promoted by the media. High ranking civil servants and those who staff control mechanisms associate corruption with *maladministration, bureaucracy and non-enforcement of simplification of procedures*. They mainly emphasize their efforts for better control of the situation, as does for example Police's Division of Internal Affairs.

According to the analysed justice's documents, namely, courts' decisions, prosecutors' findings, articles in legal periodicals etc., all remain adherent to legalese, and 'corruption' did not exist in their vocabulary during the research period (2006-09). The same applies for the Police Division of Internal Affairs.

Media comments on corruption are grounded in general and still vague notions about the 'weak Greek state and the weak public administration', resulting in illegal practices. Although they refer to socio-structural and democratic variables, they are unable to give a more sophisticated analysis, thus reproducing mundane theories and trivial comments, around law enforcement and control mechanisms.

For NGOs the issue is 'a fight' and 'a battle' against illegal practices and corruption: 'the snake's egg', etc. The term corruption is regarded as given and overused. Their line of argument coincides sometimes with that of the media. They advocate a generalized and synchronized effort of all governments and the involvement of civil society to confront corruption.

Economy, distinguish between 'bad' state/public sector and 'good' private sector. They regard 'political-party interests, social class interests and complicated legislation' as the main causes of corruption.

The overall conclusion of the first period of research was that according to the texts analysed, the target groups' perceptions of corruption in Greece are not considerably different from the corresponding reports of international organisations (TI, OECD, World Bank, etc). This shows the big influence they have.

The policy which is promoted is the strengthening of control mechanisms and severe legislation to prevent the 'evil' and the outbreak of the 'disease'.

2. Perceptions of corruption according to non-public discourse (2nd Phase)

The interviewees, in general, regard corruption as a global phenomenon, which has existed always in the whole social stratification with different accentuations and forms.

The vast majority of them consider *petty* corruption in Greece to be prevalent, but when requested to define the specific areas, they refer to *public administration* and then they specified certain *services where much money flows*, namely taxation, urban planning, forest protection, garbage and trash policy.

All interviewees from every group strongly denied that their own group has a serious problem, as well as that the whole public sector is corrupt: 'there are honest and dishonest people everywhere'.

The *transparency of the operation of political parties* is regarded as the most serious issue, followed by the role of private economic interests and the media ('grand corruption').

Judges differentiated corruption for legal and illegal activities, and criticised the term 'corruption' as general and inadequate to describe a crime. Even though it is useful for the communication, it is still *broad*, offering the opportunity for moralising.

The General Inspector of Public Administration underlined that three main factors produce corruption in public administration: its reliance on governments and party politics, money transactions

between citizens and public services, and overregulation, complex legislation, as well as ambiguities in legislation ('grey zone') offering high discretionary power to public administration. No real reform will be effective if the involvement of politics in public administration continues.

This view corresponds to some degree with the results of GPO carried out on behalf of public servants' Unions (ADEDY) in September 2005, according to which 31.4% of the questioned sample consider that corruption is an issue related to party-loyalties, 30.8% to political leadership, 20.5% to financial and entrepreneurial factors, and 13.6% to civil servants themselves (3.7% gave no answer; total sample 1,200 person over 18 y.o.)³.

Police ascribed corruption in the corps as 'occasional' and attributed it to the *low interest of the leadership* (political and natural) in the everyday problems of police officers, but above all its 'failure to inspire and represent them'.

The journalists interviewed define the phenomenon as 'an exchange which is not necessarily monetary and not always illegal' (in terms of law). In spite of corruption's existence in western societies, what differentiates it from its Greek version is the absence of 'rules of the game'.

NGOs' regard corruption as '*social illness*'. According to them, in developed countries corruption emerges only in elites (grand corruption), whereby if it is discovered, it is usually punished, contrary to what occurs in Greece.

Representatives of employers (credit institutes and enterprises) consider the state in general and the Greek state in specific, as significant factors in corruption because it operates against free competition and efficiency.

The representative of the employees has the opposite view. Most Greek companies do not promote competition through innovation and quality, but rely on public procurements. Businessmen advance corruption (paraeconomy and illegal labour force) using every means for maximization of their profit, such as labour cost squeezing and privatizations. For him corruption is *the commercialization of democratic values, the dominance of firms' profit over human capital*.

Regarding the **causes of corruption**, the approaches mainly followed two lines: an individualistic-ethicist or economist approach, and a sociological approach with either political, or economic and legal accentuation. The historical dimension exists more or less in all views, while argument about the 'non-enforcement' of legislation was hardly mentioned.

a) Corruption reflects low morals and the low quality of a person; corruption is the result of rational choice.

b) Corruption is a product and side effect of economic and political development – *social and financial structures*, which took place in the post-war era.

According to the interviewees, during the 80's the problem in Greece is expanded and took modern forms, while during the 90's corrupt practices were established, improved and refined. Corruption is the product of the intensive conflict of interests during the last decades and the 'widened' access to power (not only) in Greece. For some of them corruption is regarded to be a product and reflection of capitalism, while for others it is attributed to overregulation and low quality of legislation.

Concerning the **seriousness of corruption**, the interviewees do not think that corruption in Greece is higher or much higher than

3. The research is no longer available online.

in other countries, but that mass media exaggerate it for reasons of impression and sensation. This causes diffusion among the citizens who in turn accept it as real and true, reproducing and overstating from their side. Yet, it is acknowledged that corruption in modern Greece must be eliminated, because it is incompatible with democratic values and economic growth ('need for reforms').

For some MPs - Justice is unqualified and powerless for investigating 'strong organised interests', so the political and economic system uses it as a means of purification for legitimating their decisions and preferences.

Many interviewees accept that corrupt practices (mainly petty corruption) may operate for the '*redistribution of wealth*'. Yet it should not be considered real redistribution of resources in favour of the socially disadvantaged and poor population, but as a way through which the middle class exploits a 'grey zone' of the public sector (not defined by the interviewees) with corrupt exchanges and mutual services (bribery, clientelism).

The reliability of CPIs is questioned by all; however, the measurement is not denied or rejected. Perceptions and attitudes are not considered sound tools for measuring corruption; instead statistics and specifically, research in court decisions, decisions of disciplinary councils and of judicial councils bring more valid and reliable data.

The EU's assistance in confronting corruption is appreciated, but all consider that EU's main interest lies in improving competition in the global economy and controlling the *capital of corruption*. Yet, in the discourse EU's role as a prototype for the country's improvement and citizens' education is declining due to its 'rapid and big enlargement, which resulted in its worn-out, debunk and heavier bureaucracy'.

Concerning **anti-corruption policies** the participants rejected repressive methods and severe punishment and placed emphasis on the strengthening of preventative measures with improvements in the education, information, sensitization, mobilization and awareness of the citizens in order moral standards to be strengthened. Moreover, they insisted on private media control through quality standards (i.e. intensive involvement of the ESR/National Council for Radio and Television for the strengthening of quality standards) – in particular the electronic, without making concrete suggestions though. They underlined the need for the transparency in public contracts with media owners, for upgrading of the role of Journalists' code of ethics, as well as of political life, the *emancipation of politics from economic interests* and the reform of electoral law (voting system); and this contrary to the analyzed documents during the first phase, where more legislation and tough control was implicit (Politics, Justice, Police, Media).

Anti-corruption legislation is regarded as sufficient, but as they underlined, the *political determination for reforms and transparency is lacking*.

From our research during the second phase it became *again* obvious that a promotion of views among different social systems operates (Media, Politics, NGOs, and Economy). We also encountered a *free* interpretation of 'corruption' corresponding to the everyday views of moral/good and immoral/evil. From the discussion we testified that some interviewees exaggerate about several situations to the disadvantage of Greece, comparing them with other countries (i.e. politicians, NGOs), like media and NGOs in the first. They frequently described petty corruption as 'wide-spread'. However, when requested to provide more information and be more concrete, they were obliged to restrict it more and more. This confirms what some interviewees (judges, and NGOs' representatives) emphasized about a general tendency of Greek citizens' to exaggerate a problem, thus

creating a negative image of their country. It is also an outcome of private media's overdraw for their own reasons.

All interviewees omitted from the discussion about corruption the role of justice as a counterbalance to state power and their authority to limit the possible abuses of political power protecting citizens and the public interest. Justice personnel from their side, instead of including independence among the targets which justice *has to attain and protect*, they content themselves with statements such as, 'justice is independent', 'untouched by political influences' and a 'fortress of democracy'.

IV. National studies

The increasing number of specialists attempting an analysis of the problem in the national context use more or less political studies having as point of reference the development of democratic governance and the Greek state (e.g. Kontoyiorgis 2005; Thermos 2005)⁴, while empirical research is missing.

Political patronage, clientelism and rent seeking are the main topics of the analysts' discourse since the 1980s, with some variations, and this concept still prevails. These are followed by the weak civil society and low social capital (Lyrintzis 1984; Sotiropoulos 2007)⁵. Many of their standpoints have been expressed by the interviewees (Politics, NGOs, Media).

The rest studies refer to elements or activities which the term corruption can or should include, to the existing control systems (e.g. preventive and pre-conventional judicial control), they make suggestions about their legal and organisational improvement, tight laws, explore the role of the specific institutions, such as the Ombudsman and the General Inspector of public administration on fighting corruption etc., or attempt a description of the Greek society on the basis of corruption (Koutsoukis & Sklias 2005)⁶.

The majority of both groups of studies consider the term as given, they use it with ease, while only few show some scepticism. Predominantly they associate corruption with economic and political development. It is actually an (anti-)corruption literature.

V. Facts and numbers

During the last twenty years Greece has employed a robust anticorruption legislation concerning the *public* as well as the *private sector*. It has also ratified all the relevant conventions of the European Union (EU), the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations (UN), integrating them gradually in the national legislation. In addition, successive laws have been issued for transparency in party financing, and against political corruption. On its own initiative Greece also established several institutions for the prevention and control of corruption in the public services. Examples include: the Police Division [i.e. Service] of Internal Affairs (DEY) in April 1999 with further authority to investigate charges of bribery and extortion of all

4. Kontoyiorgis, G. (2005). 'Corruption and political system', in Koutsoukis & Sklias (eds.), *Corruption and scandals*, 131-143; Thermos, I. (2005). 'Electoral systems and political corruption in after war Greece', in Koutsoukis & Sklias (eds.), *Corruption and scandals*, 623-631, see below.

5. Lyrintzis, Ch. (1984). 'Political parties in post-junta Greece: A case of bureaucratic clientelism?', *West European Politics*, 7: 99-118; Sotiropoulos, D. (2007). *State and Reform in Modern Southern Europe: Greece-Spain-Italy Portugal*, Athens: Potamos [in Greek].

6. Koutsoukis, K. & Sklias, P. (eds.) (2005). *Corruption and scandals in public administration and politics*, Athens: I. Sideris [in Greek].

civil servants; the General Inspector of Public Administration (GIPA) in December 2002; an extension of the Ombudsman's responsibilities in January 2003.

However, the more the country improves its normative and administrative instruments to prevent corruption and promote transparency, the lower its score at the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). In particular, Greece's score on the CPI went down from 5.05 to 5.01 in the period from 1988-1996 and plummeted in following years down to 3.8 in 2009. During the economic crisis, the score fell further to 3.4 in 2011 (80th place out of 183 countries), with a slight increase in 2012 to 3.6 (94th place of 174 countries), and in 2013 up to 4.0 (80th place out of 177 countries), the latter far less than the level of 1996 and last places an EU country (TI-CPI 1996-1998; 2003-2013)⁷.

The often-used argument by the national experts about the low scores concerns the 'non enforcement' and/or the 'inefficient' implementation of measures and improvements. These scores are not based on empirical research and hard data (e.g., case records, disciplinary decisions), but rather on observed legislative problems.

Justice Statistics show that the number of 'crimes against duties and service' has been for a long time very low; they represent 0.01-0.02 per cent of the total recorded offences after 1980 (NSSG 1980-2012: Table B1) and 0.09-0.12 per cent of the convicted after 1998 (NSSG 1980-2010: Table B4)⁸.

Similar are the findings of the various control bodies against corruption. During the period 2004-2012 only a low rate of the 10,323 cases which have been submitted to the General Inspector of Public Administration, referred to corruption. In 2011 they represented 3% of the cases (in total 1,403) and in 2012, 2.1% of the cases (in total 1,499 cases) (2012/11: 28, 39; 2013/12: 26-27)⁹.

According to the Police Division of Internal Affairs' Reports (DEY 2012: 31-36), from 1999 until 2012 the Service dealt with 8,470 cases and brought a charge against 27.8 per cent [2,357] of them. Only a small part of prosecutions represent 'corruption' for police personnel and civil servants too, i.e. bribery [max. 13.4 per cent] and breach of duty, in either the offender's or others' illegal advantage [2.1-27 per cent/ abs. 38] (DEY 2004: 26, Fig. 2; 2010: 29-31, Tables 7, 8; 2012: 27-28, Tables 7, 8)¹⁰.

Other institutions dealing with corruption are the Ombudsman and the Inspectors-Controllers Body for Public Administration [SEEDD]. Both have made few general references to 'corruption' which were maladministration cases (Ombudsman 2010/2011: 91; SEEDD 1998-2005: 4, 8; 2009: 4, 9, 11-13; 2010: 23-4; 2011: 8-9; 2012: 10-11)¹¹.

Finally, the issuing of Law 4152 [IC] in May 2013 is the recent culmination of the Greek government[s] efforts against corruption (Ministry

of Justice 2013)¹². The law introduced a *National Coordinator on anti-corruption* along with a supporting Committee and an Advisory Body. The National Coordinator is directly accountable to the Prime Minister and is Head of 12 competent control services and independent authorities involved.

After all, the view of 'corrupt' public sector is not justifiable by the previous findings. What is more, in the European Values Surveys of 1999/2000 and 2008, over 90 per cent of Greeks considered 'corruption-bribery' in the group of highly disapproved behaviours (EVS-Greece 1999, v231; EVS-Greece 2008, v239)¹³, over 83 per cent confirmed that citizens must *always* abide by the law, and over 87 per cent criticized behaviours such as 'cheating on taxes' and 'not paying fare' (see also EKKE/NCSR 2003: 29, 57)¹⁴.

Greece's very low score on the CPI index, despite its attempts to facilitate transparency, numerous control bodies, few convictions on corruption, high disapproval rate of citizens, and endless criticism from the media (e.g. *Eleftherotypia* 2007; Lambropoulou et al. 2007)¹⁵ is not easy to explain on first sight. Some studies note that moral disapproval of corruption does not necessarily associate with willingness to make a complaint about it (Killias 1998)¹⁶, or that the followed behaviour [everyday behaviour] does not necessarily coincide with the legitimising of corruption (Karstedt 2003: 389-390, 397-408)¹⁷. This is true, but it is also true that CPI is judged increasingly in terms of economic development (see also Pelagidis 2014)¹⁸. Corruption is treated primarily as a problem of political and economic liberalization and it is taken into consideration for the countries' mark in the index of economic freedom (Index of Legal and Political Environment). CPI indicators are constructed by factors not only related to the views of a group of interviewees, mostly businesspeople, about bribery and 'corruption', but also and primarily by the situation of economic freedom and deregulation (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014: 14-15; see also Sotiropoulos et al. 2011; WEF 2011: 188-189)¹⁹. This explains what the economy's representatives said

7. TI - CPI/Corruption Perception Index (1996-98; 2003-13) (<http://www.transparency.org>).

8. NSSG/National Statistical Service of Greece. Justice Statistics 1980-2012, Athens: National Printing Office (1980-1996), since 1997 only online (<http://www.statistics.gr/portal/page/portal/ESYE>) [in Greek].

9. GIPA/General Inspector of Public Administration (July 2012; July 2013). Annual Report(s) 2011, 2012, Athens (<http://www.gedd.gr/>) [in Greek].

10. DEY/Police Division of Internal Affairs (2004, 2010, 2012). Annual Reports (all reports at: http://www.astynomia.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&perform=view&id=49&Itemid=40&lang) [in Greek].

11. Ombudsman (March 2011). Annual Report 2010, Athens: National Printing Office (all reports at: <http://www.synigoros.gr/?i=stp.el.annreports>) [in Greek]; SEEDD/Inspectors-Controllers Body for Public Administration (1998-2005, 2006-09, 2010, 2011, 2012). Annual Reports, Ministry of Administrative Reform and E-government (ed.), Athens: National Printing Office (all reports at <http://www.seedd.gr/>) [in Greek].

12. Ministry of Justice (2013). National Action Plan against Corruption, Athens (http://www.ministryofjustice.gr/site/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=20z-Lk2__sw%3d&tabid=253) [in Greek].

13. EVS (2010). European Values Study 2008 - Greece, GESIS Data Archive, Cologne, ZA4776, Data file Version 2.0.0, DOI:10.4232/1.10148; EVS (2012). European Values Study 1999 - Greece, GESIS Data Archive, Cologne, ZA3801, Data file Version 3.0.1, DOI:10.4232/1.11536.

14. EKKE/NCSR (National Centre for Social Research) (2003). Greece-Europe: Society, Politics, Values (http://www.ekke.gr/ess/ess_results.doc) [in Greek].

15. *Eleftherotypia* (7 February 2007). 'Greece: European champion in corruption and bag-snatching', by K. Moschonas, (Greek newspaper; the article is no longer available online); Lambropoulou, E., Ageli, S., Papamanolis, N. & Bakali, E. (2007). The construction of corruption in Greece. A normative or cultural issue?, Discussion Paper Series No 6, Konstanz (<http://www.uni-konstanz.de/crimeandculture/papers.htm>).

16. Killias, M. (1998) 'Korruption: Vive la Repression! - Oder was sonst? Zur Blindheit der Kriminalpolitik für Ursachen und Nuancen', in H.-D. Schwind, E. Kube & H.-H. Kühne (eds.), *Festschrift für Hans Joachim Schneider zum 70. Geburtstag*, Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 239-254.

17. Karstedt, S. (2003). 'Macht, Ungleichheit und Korruption: Strukturelle und kulturelle Determinanten im internationalen Vergleich', in D. Oberwittler & S. Karstedt (eds.), *Soziologie der Kriminalität, KZfSS Sonderheft 43*, Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 384-412.

18. Pelagidis, Th. (2014). 'Policies against corruption', in M. Massourakis and Ch.V. Ghortos (eds.), *Competitiveness and Development*, Athens: EET/ Hellenic Bank Union, 575-588 [in Greek].

19. Bertelsmann Stiftung (2014). Policy performance and governance capacities in the OECD and EU, Sustainable Governance Indicators 2014, Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung (http://www.sgi-network.org/docs/2014/basics/SGI2014_Overview.pdf); Sotiropoulos, D.A., Featherstone, K. & Colino,

that 'the best state is no state', implying a state better controlled by them, i.e. the free market. It also explains why the established control bodies have very little impact on the country's ranking.

VI. Conclusions and open questions

From our interviewees and the national studies the main suggestions for confronting the problem may be placed within the *dominant conceptualisation* of corruption, e.g. controlling overregulation, law enforcement, value change, education etc.

In particular, the importance of education, which is often stressed as a way to transmit desired ethical values to juveniles and further to society, thus discouraging corruption, remains however ambiguous for two reasons. The first one concerns the definition of corruption and the relevant activities by the state and the educational system, along with the ethical system which is adopted. The second reason is related to the strong links between broader social developments and conditions with the educational system and the content of education. As far as competitive neoliberal arrangements in modern societies influence the form and content of education, it is questionable whether corruption (as officially defined and constructed) can be mitigated through the transmission of 'proper' values via education, without social changes (public participation, fair and stable taxation system, professionalism, accountability, transparency etc.) (Kavran & Wyman 2002)²⁰.

Defining corruption is not an easy task. Every definition of the phenomenon is partial and incomplete, reflecting the legal and socio-cultural context within which the relevant legislation is taking place. It also reflects the agencies and interests that participate in characterising various phenomena as 'corrupt'. Thus, corruption is more a social construction than a concrete, universal phenomenon that needs a proper definition in technical terms (e.g. an operational definition). Moreover, it is rather an evolving construction of certain social groups and interests than an act of determining the 'objective reality' of corruption, which leads necessarily to specific policy

measures for confronting it. With this I do not support the idea that certain practices such as 'bribery' or 'political patron-client exchange' are a 'social construct' made by dominant interests and rhetoric. Instead I note that the characterisation and labelling of some acts as 'corrupt' serves certain political and economic goals.

The relationship between culture and corruption is more complex than it appears; many scholars follow a line of thought which associates certain cultural traits in developing countries and in countries of the semi-periphery, including Greece, with corruption.

By using corruption as a reference point to analyse a society, we see different things than had we used, for example, social justice, changes in power or in market relations, a values crisis or globalisation. Consequently, a different diagnosis implies a different treatment.

The Greek social system with its subsystems has been researched by several native specialists, i.e. sociologists, political scientists, and media analysts, on the basis of differences and not on similarities with other developed countries in Western Europe, even though clientelist relationships exist to some degree and in various forms in all modern societies (Piattoni 2001)²¹. Contemporary developments have rarely been taken into account. Most studies begin with the peculiarities under which the Modern Greek state was formed after liberation from the Ottoman occupation – a starting point that shapes the outcome of the examination.

Corruption is *neither an issue of morals nor of embedded attitudes*; successful anti-corruption strategies must involve much more besides. It is the result of serious social or organisational problems, for which there does not exist 'a solution'.

From all the above, several issues arise for a systematic analysis being also important for an effective policy design in the area. It remains to be proved whether social, political and economic reforms in the context of good governance, as the majority of our discussants noticed, can overturn the state of balance based on 'corrupt practices' in Greece. How important are informal structures and social networks when implementing reforms? What are the roles played by international organisations and multinational companies, in fostering as well as combating corruption?

Such an approach cannot fit justifications of corruption grounded on national tradition, culture, geographic area, etc., since they seem oversimplified if not reproducing stereotypes and, finally, have no effect.

C. (2011). Sustainable Governance Indicators 2011, Greece Report, Bertelsmann Stiftung (http://www.sgi-network.org/pdf/SGI11_Greece.pdf); WEF - Schwab, K. (2011). The Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012, Geneva, Switzerland: WEF (<http://www.weforum.org/reports/global-competitiveness-report-2011-2012>).

20. Kavran, D. & Wyman, S.M. (2002). Ethics or corruption? Building a landscape for ethics training in South-Eastern Europe, New York: United Nations Public Administration Network (<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/unpan/unpan003965.pdf>).

21. Piattoni, S. (2001). Clientelism, interests, and democratic representation: The European experience in historical and comparative perspective, Cambridge/ UK et al.: Cambridge University Press.

National Anti Corruption Coordinator: The Greek answer against the corruption challenge

IOANNIS TENTES, Honorary Prosecutor of the High Court of Justice, National Coordinator against Corruption

Corruption constitutes a timeless and generalized phenomenon; an unhealthy phenomenon with multiple and severe consequences. Corruption wears down institutions; it is a danger to democracy, it causes inequalities and it affects the human rights. Furthermore, corruption deprives public resources, causes distortion to the competition and prevents economic growth.

Corruption is a complicated phenomenon. For that reason the reaction to it should be complex, multilevel and systematic. In other words, confrontation of corruption should have the characteristics of a strategy.

The Greek systematic answer to the above was the recently establishment of the National Anti Corruption Coordinator.

First of all, let me explain to you the mission of this institution and describe its responsibilities and characteristics.

Its first and most important responsibility is the formation of the National Strategy for the prevention and suppression of corruption phenomena.

Its second responsibility is the monitoring of the appropriate strategy's implementation by the public services and the rest stakeholders involved in its implementation as well as the evaluation of this implementation.

Finally, the National Coordinator is responsible for coordinating the actions of all entities involved in the fight against corruption such as: ministerial and administrative services overall, authorities such as the General Inspector of the Public Administration, the Financial Intelligence Unit, the Financial and Economic Crime Unit, Judicial Authorities in general (to the extent that their constitutional independence is not affected) etc.

I will briefly explain some of the characteristics of the National Coordinator which are indicative of his mission, his dynamic and his solemnity:

a – The National Coordinator is an independent state entity. The founding law explicitly states that: "The National Coordinator is fully independent in the performance of his duties".

b – He has a wide scope which extends to all levels of the public sector: political, governmental, judicial and administrative.

c – He is basically a policy making authority. He forms the National Strategy against Corruption. This specifically means:

– He formulates a relevant Strategic Plan, which he translates into concrete measures, actions and updates it, when necessary.

– He develops and specifies practices within existing institutional framework.

– He acts as the driving force behind amendments and supplements to the normative framework, when this is needed, by streamlining the legislative procedure with his proposals and ideas.

d – The use of the term "Strategy" in the founding law is not accidental. It is intended to state that it concerns more than mere 'policy'. Strategy is the long term, complex and multifaceted policy; the integrated policy.

e – His policy making competence is also surrounded by control (in a broader sense of the word) and coordinative responsibilities. His primary goal is to accomplish unity, awareness and effectiveness.

The Greek institutional framework includes a variety of strict laws against corruption as well as credible law enforcement authorities. However, except for the necessary amendments and improvements to the legislation, there is a pressing need for rational organization, systematization and coordination of the various prosecution mechanisms, as well as for implementation of modern prevention policies.

The fact of the establishment of the new National Coordinator's institution and the messages we received from the contacts we had so far show the solid and strong will of the Government, the Parliament and the entire Greek society to attempt a systematic and concerted crackdown on corruption.

The major pillars of the National Coordinator's Strategy are the following:

1. Enforcement of the audit mechanisms such as the Financial and Economic Crime Unit, the General Inspector of Public Administration and of the judicial system.

In particular, as far as the audit mechanisms, the reform will be concentrated on their legislative framework and on their action methodology with the introduction of risk based audit system. Also, the reform should take into account the introduction of best practices, the enforcement of cooperation among the various audit bodies as well as the inauguration of a more effective system of receipt, elaboration, evaluation of information and complaints management.

Concerning the judicial system, the interventions should concentrate on the areas of reforming and completing the penal code, introducing whistleblowers protection, enforcing asset recovery and accelerating the procedure of justice award.

2. The second major pillar of our strategy is the reorganization of public administration with the introduction of more simple and standardize procedures, minimization of the contact between the public servants and the citizens in order to prevent corruption opportunities as well as the introduction of internal control systems and code of conducts.

3. The third pillar is the communication plan in order to raise public awareness on the negative consequences of corruption, sensitize and mobilize citizens in the fight against corruption and urge them to demand accountability and information. Also, private companies should be our ally in the fight against corruption with their urge to

comply with rules that enhance transparency in order to promote entrepreneurship. Corruption hinders growth through the increase of investment cost and distortion of competition.

4. The fourth pillar is the training program. Training refers to the constant training of auditors, judges, prosecutors and to the introduction of a relevant course on corruption issues in all levels of education; primary, secondary and university level.

5. Last but not least, National Coordinator's strategy includes initiatives for the promotion of the coordinative and supervisory role of the National Coordinator as well as the evaluation of all the necessary information for the constant update of the National Strategy.



Combating corruption

Brigadier General KONSTANTINOS PANAGIOTOPOULOS, Head of the Directorate of Management & Strategy for Home Affairs, Ministry of Public Order & Citizen Protection

Corruption is a deeply anti-social behaviour that undermines the democratic institutions, jeopardizes the economic development and the rule of law.

The importance of combating corruption demonstrated by the fact of dealing with the multitude of leading international organizations such as the the European Union, the Council of Europe, United Nations, the G8, the OECD Financial Action Task Force, INTERPOL.

The phenomenon of corruption refers to large or small countries, to rich or poor. But we must recognize that the results are catastrophic for the economies of those countries that are underdeveloped or under development.

The real problem of fighting corruption seems to lie rather in the individuals culture, the administration structure and the application of the relevant laws which refers to prevention, investigation, prosecution and adjudication of corruption cases.

Combating corruption requires:

1. Decision to combat
2. Determination
3. Doctrine of "zero tolerance"
4. Prosecution culture of corruption phenomena, regardless of the typology («small corruption» (petty corruption) or connected to organized crime)
5. To overcome the culture of concealment and wrong meaning of faith
6. Strong legislative framework
7. Harmonization of the legislation of the Countries with the European Union acquis.
8. Strengthening of police and judicial cooperation on the operational level.
9. Information exchange according to the national legislation in the field of the combat against corruption through confidence building and networking.
10. Establishment of regular meetings of the Heads of Anti-Corruption Services.
11. Enhancement of the legislative framework and the exchange of information regarding best practices

The main pillars of fight against corruption, as defined, and by international and Legal Frame, are:

1. Prevention
2. The criminalization of corruption in both public and private sectors.
3. International cooperation
4. The identifying and the commitment and seizure of illegally money and assets
5. The implementation mechanisms (flexible
6. Transparency

The Internal Affairs of Hellenic Police, both in terms of prevention, but mainly depression, as Enforcement and an important Body of the State to combat traditional and modern forms of corruption (like extreme police behavior, violence, racism), acting according to European Conditions, has aligned its strategy to achieve under the doctrine of "zero tolerance", especially in the current socio-economic circumstances.

Internal Affairs of Hellenic Police aims to the improvement of services quality provided to the citizens, to develop confidence, collaboration and mutuality between police services and citizens, identifying pathogenesis in the followed process and submission of proposals for treatment, and the protection of integrity in Body and Public Sector.


Cases of direct detection (2013)

Cases of direct detection	108	Police	63
		Public sector	28
		Both (participation)	0
		Other	17


Arrests (2013)

Arrests	317	Police officers	57
		Special guards	8
		Employees of P. S.	41
		Individuals	211


Cases (1999 - 2013)



Arrests (1999 - 2013)



Cases of direct detection (1999 - 2013)

*Comparative results (2012-2013)*

- Total cases increased by 86%
- Cases involving police officers increased by 70%
- Cases involving employees of public sector increased by 75%
- Cases of direct detection increased by 248%
- Arrests increased by 522%
- Prosecutions increased by 172%